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Jurisdictional Statement 
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann., Section 78-2-2(3)(j) and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4), Utah Code Ann., an Order entered by the Utah Supreme 
Court on September 23, 2005, transferred this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
-vin-
Statement of the Issues 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY OR CONSIDER THE MANDATES 
OF § 31A-22-303, U.C.A., IN LIGHT OF STATE FARM'S POLICY EXCLUSIONS ON COVERAGE. 
A. Omnibus coverage is intended to insure all permissive users to the 
same extent as the owner. 
Issued preserved: Record at 125 (hereinafter as "Rec. at "); Transcript of 
Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Rec. at 171 (additionally as (Trans, 
at ") 
Standard of review: The appropriate standard of review for a trial courts 
interpretation of statutory law is correction of error. Ong Intern. (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th 
Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993). The interpretation of a contract normally presents 
a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Village Inn Apartments v. State 
Farm Fire and Casualty Co.. 790 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah App.1990); Home Sav. and Loan v. 
Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co.. 817 P.2d 341 (Utah App. 1991). 
B. Assuming the clear and unambiguous language of the policy and 
undisputed facts of the case, State Farm's policy provides $50,000 per insured. 
Issued preserved: Rec. at 124 
Standard of review: The interpretation of a contract normally presents a question 
of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Village Inn Apartments v. State Farm Fire and 
Casualty Co.. 790 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah App.1990); Home Sav. and Loan v. Aetna Cas. 
and Sur. Co.. 817 P.2d 341 (Utah App. 1991); U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Sandt. 854 
P.2d 519 (Utah 1993); Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Crook. 980 P.2d 685 (Utah 1999). 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE LANGUAGE OF STATE FARM'S 
MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY POLICY VIOLATES PUBLIC POLICY. 
Issued preserved: Rec. at 125; 171, Trans, at 33:5-13. 
Standard of review: The interpretation of a contract normally presents a question 
of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Village Inn Apartments v. State Farm Fire and 
Casualty Co.. 790 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah App.1990); Home Sav. and Loan v. Aetna Cas. 
and Sur. Co.. 817 P.2d 341 (Utah App. 1991); U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Sandt. 854 
P.2d 519 (Utah 1993); Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Crook. 980 P.2d 685 (Utah 1999). 
III. STATE FARM'S POLICY CONTAINS AN IMPLIED STEP-DOWN PROVISION TO 
LIMIT RECOVERY TO BELOW STATUTORY MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS AND IS, THEREFORE, 
CONTRARY TO UTAH LAW AND AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. 
Issued preserved: Rec. at 125; 171 ,Trans at 34:12-20. 
Standard of review: The interpretation of a contract normally presents a question 
of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Cullum v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 857 P.2d 922 
(Utah 1993); Village Inn Apartments v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.. 790 P.2d 581, 
582 (Utah App.1990); Home Sav. and Loan v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co.. 817 P.2d 341 
(Utah App. 1991). 
IV. STATE FARM'S POLICY CREATES AN AMBIGUITY THROUGH ITS 
FAILURE TO ADHERE TO LEGISLATIVE MANDATES OF COVERAGE. 
Issued preserved: Rec. at 119; 171, Trans, at 25:2-7. 
Standard of review: The interpretation of a contract normally presents a question 
of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Cullum v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 857 P.2d 922 
(Utah 1993); Village Inn Apartments v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.. 790 P.2d 581, 
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582 (Utah App.1990); Home Sav. and Loan v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co.. 817 P.2d 341 
(Utah App. 1991). 
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Determinative Statutes 
The following Statutes are determinative on this appeal: 
Utah Code Annotated, § 31A-22-303. Motor vehicle liability coverage. (Attached 
hereto as Addendum "A") 
Utah Code Annotated, § 31A-22-304. Motor vehicle liability policy minimum 
limits (Attached hereto as Addendum "B") 
Utah Code Annotated, § 31A-21-308. Limitations on loss to be borne by insurer. 
(Attached hereto as Addendum "C") 
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Statement of the Case 
This case presents an issue of first impression in Utah. The essential question 
before this Court is whether Utah's compulsory automobile insurance statute, U.C.A. 
§31A-22-303, supports a limitation of liability to a single policy limit regardless of the 
number of negligent insureds. To that end, a review of critical issues is required. 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case arises from an automobile accident occurring on May 11, 2003, wherein 
Appellant Ruby Deherrera was a passenger in a motor vehicle driven by Manuel Olmos, 
who had permission to operate the vehicle from the owner, Robert Pacheco. Robert 
Pacheco was the named insured on a policy issued by Appellee State Farm Insurance, 
which covered the subject vehicle. Rae-Ann Martinez was also a passenger in the 
vehicle. 
The Appellee (State Farm) stipulated for the purpose of its declaratory action that 
Manuel Olmos, Robert Pacheco, and Rae-Ann Martinez were insureds under the State 
Farm policy. Rec at 171; Trans, at 4:16-5:3. The Appellee further stipulated for the 
purpose of the declaratory action that Manuel Olmos, Robert Pacheco, and Rae-Ann 
Martinez were each negligent in causing injury to Ruby Deherrera. IdL Trans, at 15:19-
20. 
Appellant asserted below that she was entitled to damages from each of the three 
negligent parties and that the policy issued by State Farm must indemnify and provide 
separate coverage for each negligent actor. State Farm's position below was, irrespective 
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of whether more than one insured is at fault for causing injury, its limits of liability are 
not increased, and the policy unambiguously precluded recovery for any amount over 
$50,000.00. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Appellee State Farm Insurance brought a declaratory judgment action to determine 
its rights and liabilities under a policy of motor vehicle insurance issued to Robert 
Pacheco. State Farm moved for summary judgment asserting that its policy expressly 
limited its liability to the $50,000 per person coverage as it would otherwise apply to 
multiple insureds. 
In response to the declaratory judgment action, Appellant filed her answer, third-
party complaint, and cross-claim. Appellant resisted the motion for summary judgment 
asserting that the State Farm policy unambiguously provided $50,000 of coverage to an 
insured for negligence in causing injury to one person, and that each of the three insured 
tortfeasors were entitled to such coverage respectively. Appellant asserted that to the 
extent that State Farm's policy failed to clearly and unequivocally exclude such coverage, 
it was ambiguous. Appellant further contended that the State Farm policy was at odds 
with Utah's omnibus provision set forth in Section 31A-22-303, U.C.A. Appellant filed a 
cross motion for summary judgment seeking additional liability coverage in the amount 
of $100,000.00, being $50,000.00 for each of the other negligent parties. 
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C. Disposition in the trial court 
On August 3, 2005, the lower court heard oral argument on Appellee State Farm's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The lower court ruled from the bench in favor of State 
Farm Insurance, and against the Appellant. See Record at 171 (Transcript of Proceedings 
attached as Addendum "D"); Order Granting Summary Judgment, Addendum "E.M 
Relevant Facts 
The following facts are undisputed as stipulated to by the parties for purposes of 
State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment: 
Robert D. Pacheco was the owner of a Pontiac Sunfire involved in the'Mayll, 
2003 accident, and was negligent in entrusting the operation of the vehicle to Manuel 
Olmos. Manuel Olmos was the permissive driver of the Pacheco vehicle involved in the 
May 11, 2003 accident, and was negligent in the operation of said vehicle. Rae-Ann 
Martinez was a front seat passenger in the Pacheco vehicle, and was negligent when she 
grabbed the steering wheel causing the vehicle to abruptly swerve causing the vehicle to 
crash resulting in Appellant's injuries and damages. 
Based upon the parties' stipulation below, this Court is to consider as undisputed 
that Defendants Pacheco, Olmos, and Martinez are negligent and insured under State 
Farm's policy at issue here. Rec. at 171: Trans, at 4:16-5:3: 15:19-20. 
State Farm Insurance Company issued a Policy of Insurance titled "Your State 
Farm Car Policy" to Robert D. Pacheco. (Pacheco Insurance Policy.) The Policy 
identifies the named insured as Robert D. Pacheco, and extends, subject to its terms, 
-7-
conditions, and exclusions, certain coverage to an "insured" as defined in the particular 
coverage. 
The terms of the Policy provide that State Farm will pay those damages, subject to 
the terms, conditions, exclusions, definitions, and limitations, that "an insured" becomes 
legally liable to pay because of bodily injury to others and damage to or destruction of 
property, including loss of use, caused by an accident resulting from the ownership, 
maintenance, or use of "your car" as defined more fully in the Policy. See Pacheco Policy 
as Addendum "F" hereto. 
The Policy extends liability coverage, subject to the terms, conditions, exclusions, 
and limitations, to the use by an insured of a car as defined in the Policy. The Policy 
states that "[t]he amount of bodily injury liability coverage is shown on the declarations 
page," which in this case provided $50,000 liability coverage per person for bodily injury. 
The Policy further provides that "[w]e will pay damages for which an insured is legally 
liable up to these amounts." (Pacheco Insurance Policy) 
State Farm paid $50,000 toward settling DeHerrera's claims against all three 
negligent parties insured by State Farm (Pacheco, Olmos, and Martinez) and reserved for 
its declaratory judgment action the additional claims sought by Appellant. Rec. at 70-75 
(State Farm Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief). 
Summary of Arguments 
On this appeal, Appellant is challenging the lower court's grant of summary 
judgment to Plaintiff/Appellee State Farm Insurance Company (hereinafter as "State 
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Farm"). The lower court ruled that Appellant DeHerrera was not entitled to multiple 
liability coverages arising out of a single motor vehicle policy based upon there being 
more than one negligent insured. Appellant assigns as error the lower court's 
interpretation of the policy against the backdrop of Utah statutory law governing motor 
vehicle liability coverage in Section 3 l-A-22-303, U.C.A. 
It is further asserted on this appeal that the lower court's interpretation of the 
policy violates public policy with respect to limiting coverage contrary to the mandated 
omnibus coverage afforded by law, and that the public will, generally, be prejudiced by 
such interpretation in the absence of a clear legislative intent to permit insurers to limit 
coverage as in this case. Appellant submits that the import of the limitation of liability 
clause in the policy creates an impermissible, implied step-down effect of coverage, 
which is prohibited under Utah law, and against public policy. 
In the alternative, Appellant asserted that State Farm's policy was inherently 
ambiguous through its creation of a limitation not permitted under Utah law and contrary 
to public policy by too broadly limiting its liability contrary to mandated coverage. 
ARGUMENT 
It is urged on appeal that the trial court committed reversible error in ruling, as a 
matter of law, that the stated per person policy limit of the State Farm policy is to be 
shared between the tortfeasors — essentially accepting State Farm's argument that the 
insurance policy limits apply only to the injured person through the covered vehicle, 
irrespective of the number of negligent insureds. Rec. at 171: Trans, at 34. Therefore, 
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according to the trial court's holding, when multiple negligent actors coalesce to create 
one harm with one vehicle, one set of policy limits are divided and shared among the 
negligent, insured parties. However, such a conclusion is inconsistent with Utah's 
statutory mandates and State Farm's policy, and the judgment of the lower court should 
therefore be reversed. 
There are a scant number of decisions from other jurisdictions dealing with these 
issues, and the courts are split as will be shown below.1 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY OR CONSIDER THE 
MANDATES OF § 31A-22-303, U.C.A., IN LIGHT OF STATE FARM'S 
POLICY EXCLUSIONS ON COVERAGE. 
A. Omnibus coverage is intended to insure all permissive users to the same 
extent as the owner. 
At the heart of this controversy is the Utah omnibus statute found in Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-22-303 (1994). It is undisputed that Utah law requires motor vehicle owners 
to maintain owner's or operator's security (Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-301(2) (2002), and 
1 Those decisions finding multiple coverage include: Miller v. Amundson. 345 N.W.2d 
494 (Wise. 1984); Viking Ins. Co. of Wis, v. Petersen. 784 P.2d 437 (Ore. 1989); Iaquinta 
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 510 N.W.2d 715 (Wis. 1993); Haislip v. Southern Heritage Ins. Co.. 492 
S.E.2d 135 (Va. 1993). Decisions limiting coverage include: GRE Insurance Group v. 
Green. 980 P.2d 963 (Az. 1999); Severude v. American Family Ins. Co.. 639 N.W.2d 772 
(Wis. App. 2001); Schulte v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co.. 699 N.W.2d 437 (SD 2005); 
Murbachv.NoeL 798 N.E.2d 810 (Ill.App.Ct. 2003); Infinity Ins. Co. v. Dodson. 2000 MT 
287, 14 P.3d 487; American Standard Ins. Co. v. May. 972 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. 1998). 
Decisions finding limited coverage based on differing facts from prior decisions finding 
multiple limits apply include: Folkman v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.. 2002 WI 237, 652 
N.W.2d 406; Johnson v. Windsor. 597 S.E.2d 31 (Va. 2004). 
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any such insurance policy must include the coverage required by Utah Code Ann. § 31A-
22-303 (2002). It is assumed in this case that the policy issued by State Farm Insurance 
to Defendant Pacheco was purchased to satisfy the security requirement of Section 41-
12a-301(2), and required by law to contain the coverage requirements of Section 31A-22-
303, U.C.A. 
Section 31A-22-303 of the Utah Code provides:2 
(l)(a) In addition to complying with the requirements of Chapter 21, 
Insurance Contracts in General, and Chapter 22, Part 2, Liability 
Insurance in General, a policy of motor vehicle liability coverage 
under Subsection 31 A-22-302(l)(a) shall: 
(I) name the motor vehicle owner or operator in whose 
name the policy was purchased, state that named insured's 
address, the coverage afforded, the premium charged, the 
policy period, and the limits of liability; 
(ii)(A) if it is an owner's policy, designate by appropriate 
reference all the motor vehicles on which coverage is granted, 
insure the person named in the policy, insure any other person 
using any named motor vehicle with the express or implied 
permission of the named insured, and, except as provided in 
Subsection (7), insure any person included in Subsection 
(l)(a)(iii) against loss from the liability imposed by law for 
damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of 
these motor vehicles within the United States and Canada, 
subject to limits exclusive of interest and costs, for each 
motor vehicle, in amounts not less than the minimum limits 
specified under Section 31A-22-304; 
Therefore, as a matter of Utah law, the subject policy "covered" the Pacheco 
vehicle and insured" Mr. Pacheco. The policy, as required by law, further insured uany 
2 Section 31 A-22-303 of the Utah Code was rewritten and became effective after the 
subject accident. A copy of the former Section is provided as Addendum "A" hereto. 
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other person using any named motor vehicle with the express or implied permission of the 
named insured/' It should also be noted that under this Court's ruling in Speros v. Fricke. 
2004 UT 69, f 35-36, 98 P.3d 28, any person occupying a motor vehicle is a "permissive 
user." In this case, additional negligence claims were asserted against Manual Olmos as 
the permissive operator of the vehicle, and Rae-Ann Martinez as a passenger. State Farm 
stipulated below that issues of liability were not disputed. Rec. at 171; Trans 26:18-20. 
The term "omnibus" has been engrafted into Utah law and used to define this 
broad effect of coverage to permissive users of automobiles. Rasmussen v. Western Cas. 
& Sur. Co.. 393 P.2d 376, 378, 15 Utah 2d 333 (Utah 1964). 
Like §31A-22-303 of the Utah Code, most omnibus statutes require that an 
insurance policy issued to the owner of the vehicle cover both the owner and all other 
permissive users. Therefore, if the policy does not say otherwise, ,f[T]he operation of an 
omnibus clause creates liability insurance in favor of persons other than the named 
insured to the same degree as the insured." Estate of Trobaugh v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 
2001 SD 37,K 21, 623 N.W.2d 497. See also Rasmussen v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co.. 393 
P.2d 376, 15 Utah 2d 333,(Utah 1964)(The unqualified word insured1 includes the named 
insured and also includes. . .any person while using an owned automobile). Accordingly, 
to comply with an omnibus statute an insurance policy issued in Utah must cover both the 
owner and all permissive users. Section 31A-22-303, U.C.A., Speros. supra. 
The interplay between the omnibus laws and collective acts of negligence on the 
same insurance policy remains a novel topic, and has not been addressed in Utah. In 
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1984 the Wisconsin Supreme Court appears to be the first Court to review the issue in 
Miller v. Amundson. 345 N.W.2d 494 (Wis. 1984). In Miller, the Court upheld the lower 
court's award of damages for injuries a young boy received when he fell from the back of 
a pickup truck driven by his grandmother and where his mother was a passenger. 
The judgment in that case required the insurer to provide $100,000 of automobile 
liability insurance coverage to each of the defendants, who were both found causally 
negligent, even though the policy provided $100,000 single limit coverage. The Miller 
policy was issued to the youth's father, who was not involved with the accident. 
Miller is particularly instructive since the Court considered a policy exclusion 
similar to that in the instant case: 
The insurance afforded under Bodily Injury and Property Damage 
Liability Coverages applies separately to each Insured against whom claim 
is made or suit is brought, but the inclusion herein of more than one Insured 
shall not operate to increase the limits of the Company's liability. 
Miller. 345 N.W.2d at 496 [Emphasis added.] 
The Miller policy exclusion that "the inclusion herein of more than one Insured 
shall not operate to increase the limits of the Company's liability" is identical to State 
Farm's policy here in that both solicit to limit the payment of money where more than one 
insured is covered for independent negligent conduct. The genuine intent of that policy 
exclusion on the part of State Farm here will be discussed below. 
In 1989 the Oregon Supreme Court in Viking Ins. Co. of Wis, v. Petersen. 784 
P.2d 437 (Ore. 1989) interpreted the Oregon omnibus statute requiring that all auto 
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insurance cover both the owner and permissive users. The Oregon Supreme Court held 
that the insurer "must provide coverage for [the] permissive user and to [the owner of the 
vehicle] for any negligent entrustment liability arising out of the use of the vehicle" Id. 
at 440. This language harmonizes with Utah law as this Court has already ruled that our 
omnibus statute is intended to ensure a permissive user of a vehicle is insured to the same 
degree as the owner, whether a premium is paid or not. Rasmussen v. Western Cas. & 
Sur. Co., 393 P.2d 376, 378, 15 Utah 2d 333 (Utah 1964); see also Estate of Trobaugh v. 
Farmers Ins. Exch., 2001 SD 37, ^ [21,623 NW2d 497. 
In 1993, courts in Wisconsin and Virginia continued this line of reasoning 
discussing circumstances identical to the facts in this case. Both jurisdictions held that 
similar omnibus statutes required separate policy limits when separate acts of negligence 
combine to create a single harm. See Iaquinta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 510 N.W.2d 715, 717-
18 (Wis. 1993); Haislip v. Southern Heritage Ins. Co., 492 S.E.2d 135 (Va. 1993). Both 
decisions were predicated on omnibus statutes similar to Utah's in that the statutes 
required that all auto insurance policies insure both the policyholder and all permissive 
users. See generally, Id Applying the settled law to the unique facts of each case, both 
courts held that a policyholder and permissive user are simultaneously insured under 
separate policy limits for their separate acts of negligence, even when the negligence 
coalesces to create one harm. Id.3 
3 In 2002, the Wisconsin Court in Folkman v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 WI237, 
652 N.W.2d 406 found against multiple insured limits contrary to Miller and Iaquinta, but 
not overruling those decisions. The Folkman Court distinguished those decisions based upon 
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Of particular significance is the ruling in Iaquinta v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 510 N.W.2d 
715, 717-18 (Wis. 1993)4, where plaintiff Iaquinta sustained injuries when the insured 
automobile, operated by Rasmussen, who was intoxicated, struck Iaquinta's automobile. 
The owner of the vehicle, Moore, had allowed Rasmussen to drive her automobile, and 
was a passenger at the time of the accident. The parties stipulated that Rasmussen 
negligently operated the automobile and that Monroe had negligently entrusted the 
automobile to Rasmussen. 
Based upon those stipulated facts in that case, the only issue presented to the lower 
court was whether the $25,000.00 per person limitation of liability contained in the 
Allstate policy restricts recovery when there are two separate and distinct acts of 
negligence (negligence in entrusting the vehicle and negligence in its operation). The 
lower court ruled against the plaintiff. Id 
On appeal in Iaquinta. as here, the appellant argued that the trial court's application 
of the omnibus statute to the facts of the case was erroneous. The Iaquinta court reversed 
the lower court's decision and relying on its prior holding in Miller, supra, held that 
an active negligence approach to imposing multiple limits. In 2004, the Supreme Court of 
Virginia revisited the same issue in Johnson v. Windsor. 597 S.E.2d 31 (Va. 2004), holding 
that the legislature had modified the omnibus statute to include specific limitations against 
multiple insured recovery. 
4 State Farm may suggest that Miller and Iaquinta. and Haislip were legislatively 
overruled by Folkman and Johnson, respectively, through revision of the omnibus statutes. 
The omnibus clause applicable to Miller and Iaquinta did not modify the pertinent section, 
and the Folkman case presented different facts resulting in an opposite ruling. Haislip 
remains persuasive based upon the omnibus statute relevant at the time, which was similar 
to Utahfs current version. 
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"separate coverage must be provided only in cases where both the named insured and the 
additional insured are actively negligent" Id. at 666 [emphasis added](citing Landsinger 
v. Family Mut. Ins. Co,. 142 Wis.2d 138, 142-43, 417 N.W.2d 899, 900-01 
(Ct.App.1987). The Iaquinta court reasoned that where the negligence of the additional 
insured is merely imputed to the named insured, or where the named insured is 
vicariously liable, the holding of Miller is inapplicable and the policy limits expressed in 
the policy are unaffected by the omnibus statute." Id. 
In the instant case, the stipulated facts are in harmony with those decisions. These 
separate and palpable acts of negligence should each obtain the coverage provided by the 
State Farm policy and as plainly expressed in Utah's omnibus clause insuring each of the 
negligent, insured individuals, and the statement in State Farm's policy that "[it] will pay 
damages an insured becomes legally liable to pay..." Addendum "F". 
The rudimentary conclusion should be reached that these three negligent 
individuals are each entitled to insurance coverage for their misdeeds as a matter of law 
under Section 31A-22-303, and it stands to reason that each should be cloaked with 
policy dollars, even when their negligence coalesces. Furthermore, the statutory mandate 
of coverage should not be parsed by an illusory game of semantics by State Farm 
interpreting its own policy. Accordingly, under State Farm's theory, either Martinez, 
Olmos, or Pacheco is insured—but not all. The meaning and intent of the omnibus clause 
of mandatory coverage loses impact. Moreover, co-active and independent negligence 
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that would otherwise be insured (and is required by law to be insured) is either not 
insured or underinsured.5 
For this very reason, the appellate court decision of Murbach v. NoeL 343 III. App. 
30 644, 798 N.E.2d 810 (III. App. 2003) cited favorably here by State Farm, and accepted 
as persuasive by the trial court, is inadequately reasoned and implausible. See GRE Ins. 
Group v. Green, 980 P2d 963 (Ariz. App. 1999)(holding the number of insureds does not 
matter as the policy limits refer to the number of persons injured); accord American 
Standard Ins. Co. of Wis, v. May. 972 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. App. 1998). 
The Murbach decision failed to cite or even analyze the Illinois omnibus clause in 
its statute, although a vague reference is made to such coverage being mandated by law. 
Id. at 810. Murbach is distinguished for that reason alone, and results in a wholesale 
affirmation and potentially abusive result against legislative intent absent an appropriate 
analysis. 
This Court has held that ff[t]he legislature should not be deemed to have created 
such a potentially unfair rule without clear and convincing language evidencing its intent 
to do so ...•" In re Marriage of Gonzalez. 2000 UT 28, 1 P.3d 1074. Furthermore, 
"[w]hen doubt or uncertainty exists as to the meaning or application of an act's 
provisions, an analysis of the act in its entirety should be undertaken and its provisions 
5 The word "coverage" includes the policy's dollar limits of liability. Smith v. National 
Indemnity Co., 57 Wis.2d 706, 712, 205 N.W.2d 365, 368 (1973). Appellant is unable to 
find any Utah decision that specifically equates "coverage" with the policy's dollar limits of 
liability. It is assumed that this is an unnecessary exercise to parallel "coverage" with policy 
dollars. 
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harmonized in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose." Clark v. Clark, 27 
P.3d 538, 540 (Utah 2001)(citing Craftsman Builderrs Supply v. Butler Mfg., 1999 UT 
18,125, 974 P.2d 1194). 
When statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the Court will not look beyond 
the plain language to determine the legislative intent. Miller Welding Supply, Inc. v. 
Utah State Tax Com'n, Auditing Div., 860 P.2d 361 (Utah App. 1993), citing Sneddon v. 
Graham, 821 P.2d 1185, 1187 (Utah App.1991). "In determining the legislative intent of 
a statute, 'the statute should be considered in the light of the purpose it was designed to 
serve and so applied as to carry out that purpose if it can be done consistent with its 
language.1" Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 
1991)(footnote omitted). 
Under a proper analysis, Utah's omnibus statute is intended to provide uniform 
mandatory insurance coverage for motorists. State Farm's policy, like others, appears to 
follow statutorily mandated omnibus coverage, but goes beyond the legislative dictate by 
limiting its monetary liability without legislative authority. There is nothing in the statute 
granting such a sweeping exclusion of coverage, and is, in fact, contrary to the express 
language of the statute granting coverage. 
This is apparent to other jurisdictions where Omnibus statutes are intended to 
augment insurance coverage, not take it away; hence, there must be separate insurance for 
each active participant of negligence regardless of the number of injuries produced. See 
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Iaquinta. 510 NW2d 715, 717-18 (Wis. 1993); Haislip, 492 SE2d 135 (Va. 1993). To hold 
otherwise would clearly undermine the intended purpose of our omnibus statute. 
Indeed, the Utah Legislature could not have intended such sophistry when the very 
purpose of the omnibus statute is to protect persons such as Appellant DeHerrera from the 
horrors of injury at the hands of multiple defendants. Nor could the legislature have 
desired persons such as defendant Pacheco to have personal exposure for his individual 
negligence when he specifically contracted with State Farm to avoid such a result. For 
precisely this reason, Defendant State Farm's position is unconvincing. The policyholder 
should be assumed to have complied with the law by purchasing insurance and should not 
be left with less than the coverage paid for, or possibly none. Furthermore, the general 
traveling public should be protected from uncompensated injury, as the legislature so 
intended, simply because more than one tortfeasor happens to be in the same vehicle with 
the victim. 
Despite the clear intent of the Legislature, State Farm argued, and the trial court 
accepted as true, that statutory liability is limited to one set of policy limits per vehicle 
even when two or more defendants insured under the same policy are negligent. There is 
simply no basis in Utah law to reconcile such a result. That any legislature would impose 
insurance coverage for all persons using, or operating a motor vehicle, yet assumably take 
it away with the same stroke of the pen, is an unacceptable conclusion. Practical 
application of the lower court's decision therefore yields a poor result as three 
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independently negligent insureds, who happen to be insured under the same policy, are 
not insured as intended by legislation, or insured for less than mandated by law. 
Finally, what is also evident from the plain language of Section 31A-22-303 of the 
Utah Code is that the Legislature's use of the word "and" when describing those persons 
who are insured, and is dispositive. That Section provides in part: 
(ii)(A) if it is an owner's policy, designate by appropriate reference 
all the motor vehicles on which coverage is granted, insure the person 
named in the policy, insure any other person using any named motor 
vehicle with the express or implied permission of the named insured, and. 
except as provided in Subsection (7), insure any person included in 
Subsection (lXa)(m)... (Emphasis added) 
Proper construction of Section 31A-22-303 requires the conclusion that the State 
Farm policy must indemnify both the named insured, permissive users, and relatives of 
the named insured in the same household. The legislature's separation of these 
subsections by the conjunctive "and," clearly mandates that a policy must provide 
coverage to each insured defined by the policy. In Haislip. supra, the opinion paid 
special attention to the use of the word "and" in the pertinent portion of the omnibus 
clause. The majority of that Court ruled that the word "and" is unambiguous with a 
dictionary meaning of "along with or together with ... added to or linked to." Haislip v. 
Southern Heritage Ins. Co.. 492 S.E.2d 135 (Va. 1993) (citing Webster's Third New 
World Dictionary, p. 80 (1986)). 
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In this setting, Olmos, Martinez, and Pacheco are each insured and entitled to 
separate coverage under the policy for their separate negligence, and the trial court erred 
by concluding otherwise. 
B. Assuming the clear and unambiguous language of the policy and 
undisputed facts of the case, State Farm's policy provides $50,000 per insured. 
This case presents a remarkable, and rare situation wherein multiple tortfeasors 
combine to cause significant injury and damage to one person. Certainly in this setting, 
Appellant is in a small, but distinguished class of claimants. From the perspective of the 
public, it is an artificial class created by the insurer and not endorsed by the legislature. 
In that regard, while the legislative intent of mandatory insurance coverage for 
Utah motorists is well-deserved, the legislature has not specifically adopted the rational 
suggested by State Farm here. In other words, Utah's statutory scheme is devoid of any 
express provision permitting insurers to limit its liability where more than one negligent 
insured under a policy causes injury in a single accident. This issue has been squarely 
addressed by other States adopting a more defined omnibus exclusion. See, e.g. Johnson 
v. Windsor. 597 S.E.2d 31 (Va. 2004). 
In Johnson it was noted that the General Assembly of Virginia specifically 
amended Section 38.2-2204 of the Code of Virginia in 1999 to include the following 
phrase: 
"... nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to prohibit an 
insurer from limiting its liability under any one policy for bodily injury or 
property damage resulting from any one accident or occurrence to the 
liability limits for such coverage set forth in the policy for any such 
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accident or occurrence, regardless of the number of insured under the 
policy." Section 38.2-2204, as amended 1999. 
Johnson, id. at 34 [emphasis added]. 
The amendment to Virginia's omnibus statute apparently arose from the Virginia 
Supreme Court's decision in Haislip v. Southern Heritage Ins. Co.. 254 Va. 265, 492 
S.E.2d 135 (1997). Even with the added legislative feature of permitting insurers to limit 
their liability for multiple insureds, the Johnson Court, in the wake of the 1999 
amendment, ruled that an insurer, in such settings, is still required to pay the per accident 
limits, and not the per person limit: 
"We are of the opinion that the plain language of the 1999 
amendment to the Omnibus Clause clearly enables an insurer to limit its 
liability even if more than one insured is liable for the accident or 
occurrence. However, such limit is that stated as the "per accident or 
occurrence" limit, rather than the "per person" limit." 
Johnson. 597 S.E.2d at 34. 
What is apparent in Johnson, as should be here, is that the Legislature has never 
intended to leave an at-fault insured without some form of coverage. Having never dealt 
with this issue, Utah's Legislature has not addressed the issue posed herein, but what 
remains clear is that the Legislature has manifested its intent to mandate coverage for all 
persons operating or using a motor vehicle. Section 31A-22-303, U.C.A., Section 31A-
22-302, U.C.A. 
For that reason alone, State Farm's policy goes well beyond the Legislative intent 
and surpasses the strict dictates of our Omnibus Clause. The practical ramifications of 
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the trial court's ruling, and State Farm's strained approach, is that an insurer can 
effectively preclude coverage for injured persons who happen to be among other co-
negligent parties despite the Legislature's mandate. Additionally, the foreseeable 
consequences of an individual like DeHerrera being in the unfortuitous position she was 
in is left without adequate remedy that was afforded to her by the Legislature, State 
Farm, being a national insurer, apparently has broadly modified its policies to avoid such 
a situation in jurisdictions, like Utah, that has yet to face the dilemma. It is not the intent 
of the State Farm policy that is at issue, but its over-reaching effect that is contrary to 
Utah law. 
The undisputed facts of this case show that the limit for each insured under 
Pacheco's policy is $50,000 liability coverage per person suffering bodily injury, and that 
this limit applies to each of the three insureds who are liable for DeHerrera's injuries. 
The insurance contract insured Pacheco against claims for bodily injury and 
property damage subject to certain limitations, conditions, and exclusions under Section 
I-Liability-Coverage A, and sets forth who is an insured and what limits of liability are 
payable under the Policy: 
Who Is an Insured 
When we refer to your car, a newly acquired car, a temporary substitute car, 
or a non-owned car, insured means: 
1. you; 
2. your spouse; 
3. the relatives of the first person named in the declarations; 
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4. any other person while using such a car if its use is within the 
scope of consent of you or your spouse; and 
5. any other person or organization liable for the use of such a 
car by one of the above insureds. 
(Pacheco Insurance Policy) (emphasis omitted.) The Policy also provides a limitation on 
liability as follows: 
Limits of Liability 
The amount of bodily injury liability coverage is shown on the 
declarations page under "Limits of Liability - Coverage a - Bodily Injury. 
Each Person. Each Accident". Under "Each Person" is the amount of 
coverage for all damages due to bodily injury to one person. "Bodily Injury 
to one person" includes all injury and damages to others resulting from this 
bodily injury\ and all emotional distress resulting from this bodily injury 
sustained by other persons who do not sustain bodily injury. Under "Each 
Accident" is the total amount of coverage, subject to the amount shown 
under "Each, Person", for all damages due to bodily injury to two or more 
persons in the same accident. 
The amount of property damage liability coverage is shown on the 
declarations page under "Limits of Liability - Coverage A - Property 
Damage, Each Accident." 
We will pay damages for which an insured is legally liable up to 
these amounts. 
The limits of liability are not increased because more than one 
person or organization may be an insured. 
(Pacheco Insurance Policy, Addendum "F" hereto.) (emphasis original.) 
What is evident from the policy language is that the terms "these amounts," "[t]he 
limits of liability," and "the limits" all refer to the amount of liability coverage that an 
insured is entitled to receive. Based on the above policy language, the aggregate limits of 
the policy and the applicable limit for each identified circumstance are clear. State Farm 
-24-
"will pay damages for which an insured is legally liable" up to the amount of $50,000 per 
"bodily injury to one person." (Pacheco Insurance Policy, Addendum "F") 
State Farm's inclusion of "[t]he limits of liability are not increased because more 
than one person or organization may be an insured" fails since it is a limitation not 
spawned by Utah law, but its own self-serving interests derived from other jurisdictional 
losses. Therefore, State Farm must provide each of the three insureds coverage against 
DeHerrera's claims. To read the phrase "more than one person. . . may be an insured" as 
invoking the $50,000 limit per injured person would make the coverage ambiguous, 
requiring interpretation against the drafter. Alf v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.. 850 P.2d 
1272,1275 (Utah 1993). 
Furthermore, Appellant's claims do not "increase" the "limits of liability." The 
"limits of liability" are the same with respect to each insured under the policy. 
Appellant's claims are only against the negligent individuals insured under the policy, and 
not against any "insured" who may be listed or insured on the policy, but has no liability 
to Appellant. In that respect, State Farm's policy is unclear and incomplete in seeking to 
unequivocally state its intention regarding any limitation. 
The trial court erred by determining that the subject policy limited Appellant's 
recovery to a single per person amount of $50,000. 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE LANGUAGE OF STATE FARM'S 
MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY POLICY VIOLATES PUBLIC POLICY. 
The apparent legislative intent behind our omnibus statute is publically frustrated 
when an insurer provides coverage, and then condition that coverage by asserting 
exclusion of multiple insureds causing harm. 
The case of Error v. Western Home Insurance Co.. 762 P.2d 1077 (Utah 1988) 
draws a close analogy to the instant case. In Error, the insurer denied coverage to a co-
insured spouse under policy exclusions for "neglect" and "fraud" based upon her 
husband's intentional act of burning down the couple's home. The trial judge ruled for 
the wife, holding the exclusions inapplicable. This Court affirmed, stating: 
[T]he rule of law in a majority of jurisdictions is that an innocent insured is 
not necessarily precluded as a matter of law from recovering on a fire 
insurance policy because a coinsured intentionally destroyed the insured 
premises. The rationales behind this rule vary, but fall into three broad—and 
sometimes overlapping—categories. Some jurisdictions focus upon the 
insured's property interest. Others focus upon the insured's obligations 
under the insurance policy. The rationale that most appeals to our sense of 
reason and fairness, and the rationale we adopt today, is that which focuses 
upon the responsibility for the fraudulent act. 
Error. 762 P.2d at 1080 (footnotes omitted)(emphasis added). 
Although Error is based on different facts and insurance policy exclusions, it 
nevertheless created a well-deserved rationale for the Court when considering 
exclusionary clauses in light of public policy. That "rationale" is simply premised upon a 
"sense of reason and fairness." 
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In Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call. 712 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1985) it was held that "an 
insurer may include in a policy any number or kind of exceptions and limitations to which 
an insured will agree unless contrary to statute or public policy." Thus, an "insurer 
rightfully contracts with an insured regarding the particular risks it will undertake or, to 
the contrary, the risks it will not assume, as long as the contract does not violate either 
statutory law or public policy." Taylor v. American Fire and Cas. Co., 925 P.2d 1279, 
1282 (Utah App. 1996). 
Section 31A-21-308 of the Utah Code concerns "[limitations on loss to be borne 
by insurer," and provides in part: 
(1) An insurance policy indemnifying an insured against loss may 
by clear language limit the part of the loss to be paid by the insurer to a 
specified or determinable maximum amount,... 
What is evident from Section 31A-21-308 is that any language purporting to limit 
coverage, in any sense, must be "clearly" set forth. Exclusions contained in insurance 
policies must be phrased in "language which clearly and unmistakably communicates to 
the insured the specific circumstances under which the expected coverage will not be 
provided." Alf v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Utah 1993). 
State Farm's policy in this regard is lacking clarity with respect to the end result it 
sought, and found in the lower court. The policy clearly limits its liability with respect to 
"indemnifying an insured against loss...to a specified or determinable maximum amount." 
See Section 31A-22-308, U.C.A. It is urged by the insurer that it is permitted to preclude 
multiple coverage for its insureds based upon the policy language that "[t]he limits of 
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liability are not increased because more than one person...may be an insured." What is 
unclear with the exclusion is whether it is applied as done so by the trial court, whether it 
applies to the aggregate coverage on a per accident basis, or each insured is entitled to the 
separate limits of liability. The limitation on liability clause can further be read as a form 
of stacking the limits for more than one insured, but that is also unclear. This is not a 
stacking issue, but independent coverage for separate negligence. The specific limitation 
language may also be interpreted as applying to all insured, not just negligent insureds. 
This approach is more plausible in light of the Policy's requirement that 
indemnification is only available (and necessary) when an injured person asserts a claim 
for which he/she is legally entitled to assert. The phrase "legally entitled" is interpreted 
by this Court to mean a claim "that is able to be reduced to judgment in a court of law." 
Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 927 P.2d 192, 195 (Utah Ct.App.1996). 
Therefore, it is axiomatic that the "limits of liability are not increased because more than 
one person may be an insured," since not all insureds under a policy are exposed to a 
claim that can be reduced to a judgment. 
State Farm prevailed below by convincing the court that its limits of liability are 
not increased because more than one person may be an "insured," to mean the same as the 
limits of liability are not increased because more than one claim is brought against more 
than one person who may be an insured. As previously stated, an "insured" under the 
policy does not always equate to a negligent individual. State Farm's policy makes no 
clear distinction. 
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In Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Call 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985), this Court endorsed a 
public polciy analysis from the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Bishop v. Allstate 
Insurance Co., 623 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1981), which stated: 
An exclusionary clause in an insurance contract which reduces 
below minimum or eliminates either of these coverages [basic reparations 
benefits and minimum liability coverage] effectively renders a driver 
uninsured to the extent of the reduction or elimination. Because the stated 
purpose of the MVRA is to assure that a driver be insured to a minimum 
level, such an exclusion contravenes the purpose and policy of the 
compulsory insurance act. 
Call at 234-35 (quoting Bishop at 865-66 (citations omitted)). 
The Call Court further followed the Washington Supreme Court that reached a 
similar result based upon a public policy analysis when it stated: 
This clause prevents a specific class of innocent victims, those persons 
related to and living with the negligent driver, from receiving financial 
protection under an insurance policy containing such a clause. In essence, 
this clause excludes from protection an entire class of innocent victims for 
no good reason. 
The exclusion becomes particularly disturbing when viewed in light 
of the fact that this class of victims is the one most frequently exposed to 
the potential negligence of the named insured. Typical family relations 
require family members to ride together on the way to work, church, school, 
social functions, or family outings. Consequently, there is no practical 
method by which the class of persons excluded from protection by this 
provision may conform their activities so as to avoid exposure to the risk of 
riding with someone who, as to them, is uninsured. 
Call at 235 (quoting Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co. v. Wiscomb. 97 Wash.2d 203, 
208, 643 P.2d 441, 444 (1982)). 
-29-
What is evident from our jurisprudence and followed from other jurisdictions, is 
the public protection afforded through compulsory insurance laws to avoid the 
consequences where there is "no practical method by which the class of persons excluded 
from protection...may conform their activities so as to avoid exposure to the risk of riding 
with someone who, as to them, is uninsured." Wiscomb. supra at 444 [Italics added]. 
The lower court erred in failing to find that State Farm's policy does not offend 
public policy. 
POINT III. 
STATE FARM'S POLICY CONTAINS AN UNLAWFUL, IMPLIED STEP-DOWN 
PROVISION TO LIMIT RECOVERY TO BELOW STATUTORY 
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS AND IS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. 
Section 31A-22-303(l)(a)(ii)(A) of the Utah Code provides that an owner's policy 
must insure not only the person named in the policy, but also any other person using the 
named automobile with the express or implied permission of the named insured, as well 
as relatives of the named insured who are residents of the household. Subsection 
(l)(a)(iii) then provides that the policy must "insure persons related to the named insured 
... to the same extent as the named insured." IcL § 31A-22-303(l)(a)(iii). The legislature 
has therefore provided for two categories of insureds to be covered in addition to the 
named insured: i.e. relatives and permissive users. There is a marked difference between 
relatives and permissive users in that the statute mandates that relatives must be covered 
to the same extent as the named insured. This suggests that equal coverage is not 
required for the other group, permissive users. 
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The providing of a lesser amount of coverage is commonly referred to as a "step-
down" provision in a policy and operates to reduce liability coverage to permissive users. 
Under Utah law, an insurer is not prohibited from providing step-down coverage for 
permissive users, as long as the coverage satisfies the statutory minimums set forth in 
Section 31A-22-304, U.C.A.; Cullum v. Farmers Ins. Exchange. 857 P.2d 922 (Utah 
1993). 
In the context of the instant case, State Farm's policy includes a discernible step-
down provision in its policy by way of its claimed "limitation on liability" exposure to 
more than one insured arising out of a single accident. In its simplistic operation, Mr. 
Pacheco's policy contained a $50,000 per person limit of liability coverage, per insured. 
It is stipulated here that there are, at least, three negligent insured persons, 
including Mr. Pacheco. State Farm has settled its asserted obligation under the policy and 
obtained a release as to all three insureds. The policy's multiple insured limitation fails as 
a matter of law since, under any mathematical analysis, the permissive users are insured 
for less than the minimum statutory requirements of $25,000 per person, and Mr. Pacheco 
has not received the Ml benefit of his policy coverage. 
Had State Farm only settled Mr. Pacheco's claim for the limits of liability, the two 
remaining insureds under the policy would be without coverage and exposed to personal 
6 It is assumed that State Farm covered each of the three negligent parties for $50,000, 
since it did not argue below that either of the permissive users were insured for less, or at 
least minimum statutory requirements. 
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liability. The same would be true in any other combination. The intent of "coverage" 
becomes illusory. 
It is well settled in Utah that mere incorporation of statutory provisions not 
appearing in the contract or in attached documents is prohibited. Section 31A-21-106(1) 
provides: 
No insurance policy may contain any agreement or incorporate any 
provision not fully set forth in the policy or in an application or other 
document attached to and made a part of the policy at the time of its 
delivery. 
The subject policy simply states that "[t]he limits of liability are not increased 
because more than one person...may be an insured." The net effect of this limitation is 
actually a decrease in coverage below the statutory minimum requirements and is 
ineffective as a bar to full recovery for each insured. 
Thus, the policy incorporates coverage limits independent of statutory mandated 
coverage without fully setting forth the exclusion, subject to minimum compulsory 
coverage, in the contract. This violates the plain language and purpose of Section 31A-
21-106. Cullum at 925. The purpose of Section 31A-21-106 is "to ensure that the entire 
insurance contract is contained in one document so that the insured can determine from 
the policy exactly what coverage he or she has." Id. 
State Farm's policy only considers the limitation of its own liability and not that of 
the insureds, since the limitation is not clearly set out as ultimately affecting individual 
coverage and compliance with Utah law. Under these circumstances, an insured cannot 
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determine what coverage applies, if it applies at all. This defeats the very essence of 
insurance coverage. Public policy requires that persons purchasing insurance policies are 
entitled to be informed, in writing, of the essential terms of insurance contracts, especially 
exclusionary terms. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Martinez. 668 P.2d 498 (Utah 
1983). 
The clear law in Utah is that "where the insurer fails to disclose material 
exclusions in an automobile insurance policy and the purchaser is not informed of them in 
writing, those exclusions are invalid. Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Call 712 P.2d 236, 237 
(Utah 1985). The policy, from the standpoint of construction, is to be perceived by the 
Court as it would be understood by the average, reasonable purchaser of insurance. 
Draughon v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc. 771 P.2d 1105, 1108 (Utah App. 1989). 
Furthermore, the Utah legislature has provided some guidance with respect to 
limitations imposed by insurers: 
§ 31A-22-204. Restriction on limitation of coverage 
No insurer may limit coverage under a policy insuring against legal 
liability to claims that are first made against the insured while the policy is 
in force, unless the policy contains on the cover page, a conspicuous 
statement that the coverage of the policy is limited in that way. 
Taken in context here, State Farm, by operation of its policy, paid out its limit of 
liability to all three insureds equally, and simultaneously. The limitation of liability 
provision in the policy is further frustrated by Utah law where claims are made against 
insureds other than the primary insured under the policy. By operation of the liability 
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restriction, coverage will always be limited first to the insured when multiple claims are 
asserted and acted upon in the manner State Farm has elected here. 
A reasonable construction of the policy's limitation of liability for more than one 
insured deprives one or more of the insureds of the protection that the policy initially 
indicates it "will pay," or in an amount that is less than is mandated by Utah law. As 
there was no proper exclusion or endorsement in this policy attempting to limit coverage 
under these circumstances, State Farm simply cannot lawfully confine the liability limits 
in the manner it attempts to. To apply the limitation State Farm suggests, either all of the 
negligent actors are underinsured by less than the statutory mandatory minimum 
requirements of insurance, or two of them simply have no liability insurance. For this 
additional reason, both the permissive users and entrusting owner are each entitled to the 
policy limits. Anything less is contrary to Utah law and public policy. 
POINT IV. 
STATE FARM'S POLICY CREATES AN AMBIGUITY THROUGH ITS FAILURE TO ADHERE TO 
LEGISLATIVE MANDATES OF COVERAGE. 
Appellant DeHerrera submits that where an insurance policy goes beyond the 
essential elements of the omnibus clause with the inclusion of a liability limiting 
provision, such a broad inclusion should amount to an ambiguity which must be 
construed under operative decisions of this court favorably to the insured.7 
7 "Whether the terms of a contract are ambiguous is a question of law...." Oliphant v. 
Estate of BrunettL 64 P. 3d 587 (Utah App. 2002) citing Wade v. StangL 869 P. 2d 9, 12 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). "Contract language may be ambiguous if it is unclear, omits terms, or 
if the terms used to express the intention of the parties may be understood to have two or 
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It is well settled that an ambiguity in an insurance contract is created by the 
presence of terms or phrases that are fairly susceptible to different interpretations. An 
ambiguity in an insurance contract may arise (1) because of inconsistent or ambiguous 
language in a particular provision or (2) because of two or more contract provisions, 
when read together, give rise to different or inconsistent meanings, even though each 
provision is clear when read alone. Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Versaw, 99 P. 3d 796 
(Utah 2004); USF&G v. Sandt 854 P. 2d 519 (Utah 1993). With respect to ambiguity, the 
insurance policy must be construed in light of how the average, reasonable purchaser of 
insurance would understand the language of the policy as a whole and the policy should 
be construed in favor of coverage. Versaw, supra; Sandt supra. 
In general, purchasers of insurance ought not to be denied coverage for which they 
have paid premiums. See, e.g., State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green, 2003 UT 48 
f42, 89 P.3d 97, citing U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Sandt 854 P.2d 519, 525 (Utah 1993) 
(holding that an interpretation of an insurance policy under which the insurer would 
"never have to pay the full amount of the purchased coverage" would be 
"unconscionable"). 
An insurer should not be permitted to avoid its statutorily imposed liability by its 
insertion into the policy of a liability limiting clause which restricts the insured from 
receiving that coverage for which the premium has been paid. See Phen v. Progressive 
more plausible meanings." Village Inn Apartments v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.. 790 P. 2d 
581, 583 (Utah Ct App. 1990) (citation omitted). 
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Northern Ins. Co.. 2003 SD 133, If 10, 672 NW2d 52 at 54 (citing Westphal v. Amco Ins. 
Co.. 87 SD 404, 209 NW2d 555 (1973)). There is no way to reconcile this statement with 
the conclusion reached by the trial court and advocated by State Farm. 
By comparison, State Farm's policy at issue in this case insures each of the 
negligent individuals. There has never been a dispute on this point. Furthermore, it is 
axiomatic that Mr. Pacheco paid insurance premiums for securing liability protection, and 
certainly paid premiums with the expectation that each driver and user as defined in the 
policy would be protected with the contractually agreed amount of liability coverage. 
Utah law requires that the owner and permissive users of a vehicle be covered to 
the same degree, and an insurer cannot place in their policy a liability limiting clause 
which restricts the insured from receiving that coverage for which the premium has been 
paid. See Section 31A-22-204, U.C.A., see also Phen. 2003 SD 133,1 10, 672 NW2d at 
54. As a matter of law and sound public policy, the lower court's interpretation of State 
Farm's limitation clause produces an unconscionable result since, in this case, State Farm 
would never have to pay the full amount of the purchased coverage per insured. 
For this additional reason, State Farm's argument and the trial court's ruling to the 
effect that a policy can permissibly cap liability limits under these circumstance, is 
unpersuasive and unconscionable. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah law mandates that a permissive user of a vehicle be insured to the same 
extent as the owner, or, at least for the minimum amount imposed by law. Here, the 
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owner, the operator, and the permissive user were separately negligent and insured. In 
order to accurately carry out the will of the Legislature, all must be separately insured 
with policy dollars. This conclusion is the only result consistent with Utah law and the 
trial court's decision should therefore be reversed. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Appellant Ruby DeHerrera hereby respectively requests the opportunity to appear 
before the Court and present oral argument on this appeal in conjunction with the 
arguments raised herein. The issues raised on this appeal are matters of first impression 
in Utah and argument should be permitted. 
Dated this & / day of t JOV P \v\Lf, , 200f£ _ 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
GeorgeJ. Waddoups y 
Attorneys for Ruby Dqljerrera 
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ADDENDUM 
ADDENDUM "A 
UT ST Sec. 31A-22-303, Motor vehicle liability coverage 
Laws 2004, c. 90, and Laws 2004, c. 126, collectively rewrote this section that 
formerly provided: 
M(l)(a) In addition to complying with the requirements of Chapter 21 and Part II of 
Chapter 22, a policy of motor vehicle liability coverage under Subsection 31 A-22-302(l)(a) 
shall: 
ff(i) name the motor vehicle owner or operator in whose name the policy was 
purchased, state that named insured's address, the coverage afforded, the premium charged, 
the policy period, and the limits of liability; 
"(ii)(A) if it is an owner's policy, designate by appropriate reference all the motor 
vehicles on which coverage is granted, insure the person named in the policy, insure any 
other person using any named motor vehicle with the express or implied permission of the 
named insured, and, except as provided in Subsection (7), insure any person included in 
Subsection (l)(a)(iii) against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out 
of the ownership, maintenance, or use of these motor vehicles within the United States and 
Canada, subject to limits exclusive of interest and costs, for each motor vehicle, in amounts 
not less than the minimum limits specified under Section 31A-22-304; or 
"(B) if it is an operator's policy, insure the person named as insured against loss from 
the liability imposed upon him by law for damages arising out of the insured's use of any 
motor vehicle not owned by him, within the same territorial limits and with the same limits 
of liability as in an owner's policy under Subsection (l)(ii)(A); 
"(iii) except as provided in Subsection (7), insure persons related to the named insured 
by blood, marriage, adoption, or guardianship who are residents of the named insured's 
household, including those who usually make their home in the same household but 
temporarily live elsewhere, to the same extent as the named insured and the available 
coverage of the policy may not be reduced to the persons described in this Subsection 
(l)(a)(iii) because: 
"(A) a permissive user driving a covered motor vehicle is at fault in causing an 
accident; or 
"(B) the named insured or any of the persons described in this Subsection (l)(a)(iii) 
driving a covered motor vehicle is at fault in causing an accident; and 
"(iv) cover damages or injury resulting from a covered driver of a motor vehicle who 
is stricken by an unforeseeable paralysis, seizure, or other unconscious condition and who 
is not reasonably aware that paralysis, seizure, or other unconscious condition is about to 
occur to the extent that a person of ordinary prudence would not attempt to continue driving. 
"(b) The driver's liability under Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is limited to the insurance 
coverage. 
"(2)(a) A policy containing motor vehicle liability coverage under Subsection 
31A-22-302(l)(a)may: 
"(i) provide for the prorating of the insurance under that policy with other valid and 
collectible insurance; 
"(ii) grant any lawful coverage in addition to the required motor vehicle liability 
coverage; 
"(iii) if the policy is issued to a person other than a motor vehicle business, limit the 
coverage afforded to a motor vehicle business or its officers, agents, or employees to the 
minimum limits under Section 31A-22-304, and to those instances when there is no other 
valid and collectible insurance with at least those limits, whether the other insurance is 
primary, excess, or contingent; and 
"(iv) if issued to a motor vehicle business, restrict coverage afforded to anyone other 
than the motor vehicle business or its officers, agents, or employees to the minimum limits 
under Section 31A-22-304, and to those instances when there is no other valid and collectible 
insurance with at least those limits, whether the other insurance is primary, excess, or 
contingent. 
"(b)(i) The liability insurance coverage of a permissive user of a motor vehicle owned 
by a motor vehicle business shall be primary coverage. 
"(ii) The liability insurance coverage of a motor vehicle business shall be secondary 
to the liability insurance coverage of a permissive user as specified under Subsection 
(2)(b)(i). 
"(3) Motor vehicle liability coverage need not insure any liability: 
"(a) under any workers' compensation law under Title 34A, Utah Labor Code; 
"(b) resulting from bodily injury to or death of an employee of the named insured, 
other than a domestic employee, while engaged in the employment of the insured, or while 
engaged in the operation, maintenance, or repair of a designated vehicle; or 
"(c) resulting from damage to property owned by, rented to, bailed to, or transported 
by the insured. 
"(4) An insurance carrier providing motor vehicle liability coverage has the right to 
settle any claim covered by the policy, and if the settlement is made in good faith, the amount 
of the settlement is deductible from the limits of liability specified under Section 
31A-22-304. 
"(5) A policy containing motor vehicle liability coverage imposes on the insurer the 
duty to defend, in good faith, any person insured under the policy against any claim or suit 
seeking damages which would be payable under the policy. 
"(6)(a) If a policy containing motor vehicle liability coverage provides an insurer with 
the defense of lack of cooperation on the part of the insured, that defense is not effective 
against a third person making a claim against the insurer, unless there was collusion between 
the third person and the insured. 
"(b) If the defense of lack of cooperation is not effective against the claimant, after 
payment, the insurer is subrogated to the injured person's claim against the insured to the 
extent of the payment and is entitled to reimbursement by the insured after the injured third 
person has been made whole with respect to the claim against the insured. 
"(7) A policy of motor vehicle liability coverage under Subsection 31 A-22-302( 1) may 
specifically exclude from coverage a person who is a resident of the named insured's 
household, including a person who usually makes his home in the same household but 
temporarily lives elsewhere, if: 
"(a) at the time of the proposed exclusion, each person excluded from coverage 
satisfies the owner's or operator's security requirement of Section 41-12a-301, independently 
of the named insured's proof of owner's or operator's security; 
"(b) the named insured and the person excluded from coverage each provide written 
consent to the exclusion; and 
"(c) the insurer includes the name of each person excluded from coverage in the 
evidence of insurance provided to an additional insured or loss payee. 
"(8) A policy of motor vehicle liability coverage may limit coverage to the policy 
minimum limits under Section 31A-22-304 if the insured motor vehicle is operated by a 
person who has consumed any alcohol or any illegal drug or illegal substance if the policy 
or a specifically reduced premium was extended to the insured upon express written 
declaration executed by the insured that the insured motor vehicle would not be so operated. 
M(9)(a) When a claim is brought exclusively by a named insured or a person described 
in Subsection (l)(a)(iii) and asserted exclusively against a named insured or an individual 
described in Subsection (l)(a)(iii), the claimant may elect to resolve the claim: 
"(i) by submitting the claim to binding arbitration; or 
"(ii) through litigation. 
"(b) Once the claimant has elected to commence litigation under Subsection (9)(a)(ii), 
the claimant may not elect to resolve the claim through binding arbitration under this section 
without the written consent of both parties and the defendants liability insurer. 
,f(c)(i) Unless otherwise agreed on in writing by the parties, a claim that is submitted 
to binding arbitration under Subsection (9)(a)(i) shall be resolved by a panel of three 
arbitrators. 
"(ii) Unless otherwise agreed on in writing by the parties, each party shall select an 
arbitrator. The arbitrators selected by the parties shall select a third arbitrator. 
"(d) Unless otherwise agreed on in writing by the parties, each party will pay the fees 
and costs of the arbitrator that party selects. Both parties shall share equally the fees and 
costs of the third arbitrator. 
"(e) Except as otherwise provided in this section, an arbitration procedure conducted 
under this section shall be governed by Title 78 Chapter 31a, Utah Arbitration Act, unless 
otherwise agreed on in writing by the parties. 
"(f)(i) Discovery shall be conducted in accordance with Rules 26b through 36, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
"(ii) All issues of discovery shall be resolved by the arbitration panel. 
"(g) A written decision of two of the three arbitrators shall constitute a final decision 
of the arbitration panel. 
"(h) Prior to the rendering of the arbitration award: 
"(i) the existence of a liability insurance policy may be disclosed to the arbitration 
panel; and 
"(ii) the amount of all applicable liability insurance policy limits may not be disclosed 
to the arbitration panel. 
"(i) The amount of the arbitration award may not exceed the liability limits of all the 
defendant's applicable liability insurance policies, including applicable liability umbrella 
policies. If the initial arbitration award exceeds the liability limits of all applicable liability 
insurance policies, the arbitration award shall be reduced to an amount equal to the liability 
limits of all applicable liability insurance policies. 
"(j) The arbitration award is the final resolution of all claims between the parties 
unless the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means. 
"(k) If the arbitration panel finds that the action was not brought, pursued, or defended 
in good faith, the arbitration panel may award reasonable fees and costs against the party that 
failed to bring, pursue, or defend the claim in good faith. 
"(1) Nothing in this section is intended to limit any claim under any other portion of 
an applicable insurance policy." 
ADDENDUM "B 
U.C.A. 1953§31A-22-304 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 31 A. INSURANCE CODE 
CHAPTER 22. CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES 
PART 3. MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE 
Current through End of 2004 4th Sp. Sess. 
§ 31A-22-304. Motor vehicle liability policy minimum limits 
Policies containing motor vehicle liability coverage may not limit the insurer's 
liability under that coverage below the following: 
(l)(a) $25,000 because of liability for bodily injury to or death of one person, 
arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in any one accident; 
(b) subject to the limit for one person in Subsection (a), in the amount of $50,000 
because of liability for bodily injury to or death of two or more persons arising out of the 
use of a motor vehicle in any one accident; and 
(c) in the amount of $15,000 because of liability for injury to, or destruction of, 
property of others arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in any one accident; or 
(2) $65,000 in any one accident whether arising from bodily injury to or the death 
of others, or from destruction of, or damage to, the property of others. 
Laws 1985, c. 242, § 27; Laws 1992, c. 132, § 2; Laws 1993, c. 271, § 1. 
ADDENDUM "C 
U.C.A. 1953 § 31A-21-308 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 31 A. INSURANCE CODE 
CHAPTER 21. INSURANCE CONTRACTS IN GENERAL 
PART 3. SPECIFIC CLAUSES IN CONTRACTS 
Current through End of 2004 4th Sp. Sess. 
§ 31A-21-308. Limitations on loss to be borne by insurer 
(1) An insurance policy indemnifying an insured against loss may by clear 
language limit the part of the loss to be paid by the insurer to a specified or determinable 
maximum amount, to loss in excess of a specified or determinable amount, to a specified 
proportion of the loss which may vary with the amount of the loss, or to any combination 
of these methods. If the policy covers various risks, different limitations may be provided 
separately for each risk, if the policy clearly states that. 
(2) A policy indemnifying an insured against loss of or damage to property may 
limit the part of the loss to be paid by the insurer to a percentage of the total loss that 
corresponds to the ratio of the insured sum to a specified percentage of the value of the 
insured property. 
Laws 1985, c. 242, § 26. 
Current through End of 2004 4th Sp. Sess. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
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Vs. 
RAE-ANN MARTINEZ, an individual, 
YOLANDA HERRERA, an individual, 
ANGELA ARAGON, (a minor), and 
RUBY DeHERRERA, an individual, 
Defendants. 
Trial Court 
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SALT LAKE CITY, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 3, 2005, 9:20 AM 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Mr. Schultz, Do you agree that 
there are no issues of fact, material issues of fact 
that would preclude the summary judgment one way or the 
other and, if you know of any, tell me what you think 
they might be. 
MR. SCHULTZ: I think Your Honor, for purposes 
of this motion I do not think there are any material 
issues of fact. And why I say it that way is for this 
reason. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. SCHULTZ: For purposes of this motion we 
are assuming that the three individuals, Mr. Pacheco, 
Mr. Olmos, and Ms. Martinez would qualify as insureds 
and we are assuming that for purposes of this motion 
that there would be some liability if the case were to 
go to trial, some negligence. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. SCHULTZ: Because if you don't assume 
that, there really isn't an issue that has to be 
decided. The real issue here is strictly a legal one; 
that is, assuming those things as factual, what is the 
limit of liability for payment to one person. So I guess 
with that explanation I hope that didn't confuse the 
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1 matter but--
2 THE COURT: I think it's just a long yes. 
3 MR. SCHULTZ: Yeah. Right. 
4 THE COURT: Let me just ask you also: One 
5 thing I was puzzled about, I understand, of course, how 
6 the parties have agreed that Mr. Pacheco is an insured, 
7 I understand how Mr. Olmos, who is the driver, is an 
8 insured. Then it's agreed, I guess, as well that Ms. 
9 Martinez is an insured. How does she get that status, 
10 just out of curiosity? 
11 MR. SHULTZ: Well, she was a passenger in the 
12 car, Your Honor, who was apparently involved in some 
13 kind of an argument or fight with one or more of the 
14 other people in the vehicle. 
15 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
16 MR. SCHULTZ: And I will acknowledge that 
17 initially that was an issue that we disputed, that she 
18 would not be an insured but after, I am sure George can 
19 remind me of the name of the case. 
2 0 MR. WADDOUPS: Speros. 
21 MR. SCHULTZ: Yeah, the Speros case from the 
22 Utah Supreme Court that came down after we initially 
23 looked at this matter ruled that a passenger in such a 
24 circumstance could be considered a permissive user of 
25 the vehicle and, therefore, an insured. 
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THE COURT: Be that as it may, it's agreed for 
purposes of this hearing at least that all three of them 
are insured, that State Farm had issued a policy of 
insurance to Mr. Pacheco, who was the owner of this 
vehicle, and that State Farm as insurer then would have 
some liability. So you have agreed, then, that there 
are no facts that would preclude a summary judgment one 
way or the other. As I said, I've read your memorandum 
and particularly even read the case, one of the cases 
that you have cited, I believe it was the Noel case, 
Murbach versus Noel. So, Counsel, is there anything 
else that you would like to say in support of your 
motion for summary judgment? 
MR. SCHULTZ: Well, yes, just briefly, I'll 
try to make it quick. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. Say what you would 
like. 
MR. SCHULTZ: Thank you. I guess the key 
thing here, Your Honor, is the language, is the 
Liability Coverage A, Section 1 language of the policy 
that we quoted in our memo which states: "The amount of 
bodily injury liability coverage is shown on the 
declarations page under Limits of Liability Coverage A, 
bodily injury each person, each accident. And just for 
the own benefit, Your Honor, this is just a sheet that I 
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1 pulled up that shows it's a 50/100 policy and I don't 
2 think there's any dispute about that. 
3 THE COURT: I don't think there is either. I 
4 think the whole-- the knub of the thing is, is it 
5 $50,000 obviously per person per accident or $50,000 per 
6 person per insured per accident. 
7 MR. SCHULTZ: Right. And that's where I think 
8 the language, as you read the policy it says, "Each 
9 person is the amount of coverage for all damages due to 
10 bodily injury to one person." And then below that a 
11 little ways it says: "Under each accident is the total 
12 amount of coverage subject to the amount shown under 
13 each person for all damages due to bodily injury to two 
14 or more persons in the same accident." And then the 
15 probably critical statement here is: "The limits of 
16 liability are not increased because more than one person 
17 may be an insured." So, in other words, the policy 
18 that's sold provides up to a maximum of $50,000 for all 
19 damages to one person in one accident and a maximum of 
20 $100,000 to all persons injured in one accident. No one 
21 person can get more than 50 and all the people injured 
22 in any one accident combined can't receive more than 
23 $100,000. Now, if that last phrase has any meaning, the 
24 fact that the limits are not increased because more than 
25 one person is insured, you have to-- essentially you 
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have to write that phrase out of the policy, is our 
position, Your Honor, if you accept the position that 
Ms. DeHerrera is taking here, because it says in no 
uncertain terms that the limits of liability are not 
increased because more than one person is an insured and 
that-- and the total amount that can be paid for any one 
person for all injuries is $50,000. 
Now, if you were to-- and the Murbach case, 
as you noted, it's this exact issue and it's a case 
where two people were sued as defendants, they were both 
insureds, they actually had a trial and got a verdict of 
300 some-odd thousand. The insurer, liability insurer, 
had already paid the $100,000. Out of a 100/200 policy 
they had already paid the $100,000 and the plaintiffs 
tried to garnish and get another $100,000 and the Court 
said: No, because that would make the limit for one 
person $200,000, and that's not what the policy says. 
Any interpretation-- even if you look at this 
and say: Well, it's subject to some interpretation, 
that interpretation has to be a plausible interpretation 
and it has to be consistent with all parts of the 
policy. If you interpret this to mean that every time 
you have more than one insured involved in an accident 
in a vehicle, if it is not-- it doesn't promote a 
plausible or a reasonable result because it makes that--
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1 it actually makes the per accident limit meaningless, 
2 too, because the policy says maximum of $100,000 for any 
3 accident for all injured persons. Under the theory that 
4 Ms. DeHerrera is taking here the per person limit is 
5 more than the per accident limit now, because she claims 
6 that all three of the insureds should have to pay up to 
7 $50,000 which would extend the per person coverage to 
8 $150,000 which is fifty more than the per accident 
9 coverage. The other things that makes it implausible, 
10 Your Honor--
11 THE COURT: Well, I guess-- I'm sorry to 
12 interrupt you, Counsel, but Mr. Waddoups would say that 
13 the same interpretation would apply, it would be 
14 $100,000 per accident but it means $100,000 per insured 
15 per accident. So if there are more than one person 
16 insured, if there were three people insured and you had 
17 more than one person injured, then the total could be 
18 $300,000 as opposed to $100,000. 
19 MR. SCHULTZ: Yeah, and you could make that 
2 0 argument, he probably would make that argument, Your 
21 Honor. And, again, I would go back to the language that 
22 the limits of liability are not increased regardless of 
2 3 whether there is more than one insured and unless you 
24 essentially write that out of the policy and make it 
2 5 meaningless, you can't enforce or you are not enforcing 
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the policy as written. The other thing that I would 
just point out that the theory here changes the limits 
of liability with the number of people that might be in 
the car. And the statute, the mandatory statute that I 
pointed to speaks in terms of mandatory coverage on the 
vehicle, not on the insured people but on the vehicle, 
and Utah requires at least $25,000 per injured person, 
$50,000 per accident on the vehicle. And if you, just 
maybe taking an example here, let's say you had one of 
those panel vans that can hold up to, who knows, 10 or 
12 people, theoretically at least under the DeHerrera 
approach here, if you had that panel van insured at 
100/200 like in the Murbach case and you had 10 people 
in that vehicle, potentially you've got a million dollar 
per person coverage now on a van that on the policy 
phase is $100,000 per person. And that's the very point 
that this language covers, that you don't increase the 
limit just because more than one person might be an 
insured. And to do that in the face of this language 
would, Your Honor, in our view be going against the 
plain language of the policy and you would have to, as I 
said, write it out of the policy. And so our-- and I 
guess the other point on that, Your Honor, is that the 
argument has been made, that: Well, the purpose of 
liability coverage is to protect-- is to provide 
Page 10 
coverage for injured persons and it does provide a 
benefit for injured persons -- that's true. But this 
theory that's being espoused doesn't really have 
anything to do-- I mean logically with the severity of 
the injury. If there had only been one driver who owned 
this car, there would be no argument here that: Well, 
the coverage should be higher because the injury was 
severe. So it goes back to my point that this theory 
changes the limits just based on the number of people in 
the car. And so, Your Honor, the bottom line is, and 
you, obviously, see this clearly, and that is that we 
think that the language that says the limits cannot be 
increased regardless of the number of people who may be 
insured is clear, should be enforced, and that the fact 
that State Farm has already paid the $50,000 for the 
maximum amount payable to one person should end the 
matter and that we would ask that Your Honor rule as a 
matter of law and declare that this policy limit for 
injuries to one person is $50,000 regardless of the 
number of potential insureds. 
THE COURT: All right, sir. 
MR. SCHULTZ: Thank you very much. 
THE COURT: Mr. Waddoups, do you agree as 
well that there are no genuine issues of material fact 
as to preclude a summary judgment and if you don't 
Page 11 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
agree, tell me what they are. 
MR. WADDOUPS: Well, I think the issue is the 
interpretation of the policy and the Court it looks like 
they have enough facts to make that determination and I 
would agree. I am prepared to tell--
THE COURT: Well, you are the opponent--
MR. WADDOUPS: I am. 
THE COURT: You oppose this motion so, 
obviously, it would be your responsibility if you think 
there are facts that would keep me from ruling today, 
either in your favor or your opponent's favor, I would 
be interested in knowing what those facts are because 
they would have to be resolved at trial. 
MR. WADDOUPS: Sure. And I could go ahead and 
respond to Mr. Schultz and if you think that there's 
something in there that you think may be a disputed fact 
that troubles you, then you could reserve ruling. 
THE COURT: But you can't identify any fact 
right now. 
right now. 
MR. WADDOUPS: I'm not identifying anything 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WADDOUPS: That would preclude us--
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 
MR. WADDOUPS: I think it's important, Your 
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Honor, to look at a little bit of brief history. In 
dealing with the insurance industry you find in many 
cases insurance companies will do everything they can to 
get out of paying the coverage. In this particular case 
State Farm followed its normal path. We filed a claim 
on behalf of Ruby DeHerrera who was hurt extremely bad 
in this case. There was alcohol involved on the 
participants and as a result she was hurt very 
seriously, had a massive scar on her face, and other 
injuries, she flat-lined, she was life-flighted. State 
Farm took the position that they would extend coverage 
to Pacheco, the owner of the car, to Olmos, the driver 
of the car, but they would not extend coverage to 
Martinez who grabbed, alleged grabbed the steering 
wheel. They also said that she was not a permissive user 
of the car, so that was her second point of contention. 
And the third point of contention was that even if she 
was a covered person, even if she was a permissive user, 
her acts were intentional and therefore under their 
policy -- and all three arguments are based on their 
policy language -- that intentional acts would void the 
coverage. 
THE COURT: But they've changed their 
position now. 
MR. WADDOUPS: Well, we have argued with them 
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years, and years, and years, and finally our Supreme 
Court has ruled and knocked them down on every single 
point which is showing their policy is in violation of 
the law here in Utah. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WADDOUPS: Interestingly, they cite the 
Court an Illinois court, a case where prior courts in 
Illinois had ruled directly opposite Speros which is our 
Utah Supreme Court, for the very issues I just cited to 
the judge: coverage, permissive user, and intentional 
conduct. In those the Illinois court would deny coverage 
in Utah under Speros, which is rendered in 2 0 04, that 
does not preclude coverage. There's three other 
jurisdictions, there's Pennsylvania, there's Oregon, 
which is a State Farm case again, a grabbing the 
steering wheel case, that was in 1983, there's a 
permissive case out of Oregon, or Pennsylvania 2000, and 
there is a State Farm case in Illinois, again, where 
they all-- both courts all ruled opposite Speros. So 
our point is our jurisdiction doesn't look too close to 
other jurisdictions for determination of the issue. 
Turning now to--
THE COURT: Let me follow up with a question. 
You are saying that Murbach versus Noel is not good law, 
it's from another state, they don't agree with Utah 
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generally speaking. And then I don't recall that you 
cited any case that would support your position. 
MR. WADDOUPS: There's no other cases out 
there. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WADDOUPS: You've got all the cases. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. WADDOUPS: And the three cases I just 
cited to you of the grabbing the steering wheel are the 
other three cases in other jurisdictions that rule 
opposite Speros. 
THE COURT: On Speros, looking at the issue 
here, we are sort of past that. 
MR. WADDOUPS: All right. 
THE COURT: I think State Farm for the 
purposes of this area has agreed all three of those 
people are insureds, no dispute about that. 
MR. WADDOUPS: Right. 
THE COURT: So that's not a problem. But 
looking at the issue of the interpretation of this 
contract, they cited Murbach versus Noel and you say 
that's really not good law. I'm just asking: Is there 
some other case on this issue that supports that? 
MR. WADDOUPS: Speros gets close and I'll talk 
to you about that in a minute. That's the 2 004 case. 
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The reason I bring that up is because they were relying 
on policy language in their own policy for those other 
three issues where the Court has said-- State Farm, as 
I told you once or twice, they have had a history of 
this. That's not policy--
MR. SCHULTZ: Your Honor, I object to this 
bantering and commenting about a history of this or 
that. This is a clearcut legal issue and I think 
counsel ought to get to the point. 
THE COURT: Yeah, I want to focus on the 
legal issue here. Go ahead. 
MR. WADDOUPS: Okay. I'm going to. On Page 8 
of our memorandum we state that the policy says 
unequivocally that they will pay damages for which an 
insured, an insured is legally liable up to the amount 
of $50,000 for bodily injury to one person. Typically 
you don't have a lot of cases, Judge, where you have got 
multiple insureds contributing to the cause of the 
accident. We do have a stipulation that they are all 
covered, we do have a stipulation that they are all 
negligent. In many 
multiple defendants 
of those cases where you do 
, multiple insureds 
you will try the case separately. 
against Pacheco, we 
would have a trial 
would have a 
We 
trial 
against Martinez. 
have 
, in many cases 
would have a trial 
against 
Usually, 
Olmos, 
at the 
we 
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request of the insuring company who doesn't want to be 
prejudiced with all the conduct together and all the 
issues together. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. WADDOUPS: If we were to get a judgment 
against Pacheco for $60,000, the policy paid $50,000; if 
we were to get a judgment against Olmos for $60,000, the 
policy would pay $50,000; if we were to get a judgment 
against Martinez for $60,000, the policy would pay 
$50,000. If, however, we did Martinez first and they 
paid their $50,000, that's all we're going to pay, the 
other two insureds would be very, very upset that they 
are not getting the benefits of the coverage. And that's 
where you see, in some of these cases, where you see the 
bad faith claims. State Farm in their very own policy 
says: We are going to pay you, pay on your behalf as an 
insured up to $50,000. They don't do any examples in 
their policy, they don't do any qualifiers in their 
policy that makes it expressly clear to Pacheco, to 
Olmos, or Martinez that somehow if you're all negligent 
and you're all over the limit, we're going to have to 
divide up the fifty and only pay sixteen and some odd 
dollars per person. If they did do it that way, Your 
Honor, they would be in direct violation of the 
financial responsibility section. We disagree with Mr. 
Page 1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Schultz's and State Farm's position. They have to cover 
these people at a minimum to $25,000 per person under 
the financial responsibility section. And what they are 
trying to do and what they're trying to argue to the 
Court is they are only obligated as they construe the 
policy up to sixteen some-odd dollars. So at a minimum 
they have got to cover up to $75,000 under the statute 
as a minimum, otherwise, they're not following the law 
as to each insured having $25,000 in coverage if they 
have liability. We know under the comparative 
negligence statute here in Utah each negligent party is 
only responsible for their portion, proportionate share 
in a case. So if Pacheco has got the liability of 
$75,000, State Farm has got to pay 50% per the clause 
they just read, and so on and so forth for each insured. 
There is no-- We go through these motions a lot, Your 
Honor. I just would like to point out this point. I had 
a case with Allied once. They had two defense lawyers 
that took different positions on the policy language and 
said it was clear. We had two plaintiffs lawyers who 
had different positions who said the policy was clear. 
We have State Farm's position in this case, we have our 
position. And the judge in that case here in this 
district said: How could it be clear when everyone is 
taking a different position? If a policy language is 
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subject to different interpretations, if it's ambiguous, 
then the insurer loses. That's the status of law here 
in Utah and the status of law in almost every state in 
the United States. We have read this policy, it cannot 
possibly mean what State Farm wants it to mean. We 
understand why they want to try to do what they're doing 
but it can't possibly mean what they are trying to say 
it means. 
As to the Speros case, in the Speros--
THE COURT: Let me ask a question, Mr. 
Waddoups, before you go further. 
MR. WADDOUPS: Sure. 
THE COURT: Now, looking at the language that 
you both cited, that language from the policy or the 
contract that talks about the limits, and I'll just read 
from the-- one of the memoranda. It says: "Each person. 
Each accident. Under each person is the amount of 
coverage for all damages due to bodily injury to one 
person. Bodily injury to one person includes all injury 
and damages to others resulting from this bodily injury, 
emotional distress, et cetera." 
So I think what the plaintiff is saying, and 
I would like to have you respond to this: In order to 
interpret that provision the way you have asked me to 
interpret it, it would have to say something to the 
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effect: Under each person is the amount of coverage for 
all damages due to bodily injury to one person per each 
insured or for each insured, or something. It would 
require that we add some additional language so it's not 
just a limit per person but it's a limit per person per 
insured. Do you agree with that and how would you want 
to respond to that? 
MR. WADDOUPS: Well, I-- that--
THE COURT: In other words, this is the plain 
language that this is a per person limit -- period. It 
doesn't say per person per insured, it just says per 
person. 
MR. WADDOUPS: For each person's own 
responsibility or negligence. 
THE COURT: But it doesn't say that. 
MR. WADDOUPS: But that's what the statute 
says. That's what they're responsible for and then the 
clause that I have read before says: "State Farm," 
quote, will pay damages for which an insured--
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. WADDOUPS: You've got Pacheco is an 
insured, you have got Olmos, and you have got Martinez. 
It doesn't say all three together or all of them 
together is legally liable up to the amount of $50,000. 
It doesn't say insureds, they put an S on insured, 
Page 2 0 
1 | they've buffed off the S. They didn't make it plural, 
2 | it's singular. 
3 | THE COURT: I didn't mean to interrupt you. I 
4 I apologize for that. But I have another question but--
5 | And then the other language. "Limits of liability are 
6 I not increased because more than one person, or 
7 organization," which isn't critical here, but "--more 
8 than one person may be an insured." 
9 MR. WADDOUPS: And we are not--
10 THE COURT: When you throw that into the mix, 
11 how do you-- setting the statute and your argument 
12 there, aside from that, just focusing on the issue that 
13 you raised of contract interpretation, how would you 
14 interpret the contract, using all of that language any 
15 way other than this is a per person limit. 
16 MR. WADDOUPS: Traditionally, you're talking 
17 about increasing the policy limits, assuming that the 
18 policy limits are $50,000. 
19 THE COURT: And they are. 
20 MR. WADDOUPS: Traditionally, when you're 
21 saying increase the policy limits, you're saying the 
22 policy limits are 60 or 70, and where that comes 
23 through, where that comes about is in many cases an 
24 insurance company will not pay a claim, they're refusing 
25 to pay a claim. So their insured gets sued and then 
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they go to court. Well, if you follow certain 
procedures, you follow Dameron procedures, that insured. 
If they get hit for a judgment greater than the policy 
of fifty; for example, a hundred, then you're into an 
excess claim and then the insurance company will come in 
and pay the total judgment where the policy limits are 
now increased from fifty to a hundred. And what this 
policy is saying is: We're not going to do that. But 
that happens on occasion even in spite of their language 
if they force their insured into litigation and they 
have got to now come in and say, Well, we took you into 
litigation. That's what State Farm versus Campbell was 
all about. They had a two-fifty policy, they wouldn't 
pay it-- or $25,000 policy, they wouldn't pay it, they 
refused to pay it, they went to court, they got hit for 
two-fifty, they wouldn't pay it, and then ended up 
paying, as you know, multi-millions of dollars to their 
insured. This policy is saying: We are not going to 
increase our policy limits. We are not asking them to 
increase their policy limits. We are not saying you 
have to pay sixty to seventy per insured. We are saying 
you have to pay $50,000 for each insured's negligent 
conduct. If they wanted to make this clear, they would 
say: We will pay damages for which all of our insureds 
in any one accident may be legally liable. And they 
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1 I didn't do that. They left it singular because if they 
2 I tried to do that they would be in violation of case law, 
3 ( statutes, and public policy, because Utah has a 
4 | financial responsibility that you have got to have 
5 | $25,000 per insured. So that answers that question. And 
6 | so they're-- when you look at this language, us being in 
7 ( the insurance industry, they are trying to say: We are 
not going to go to GO or 70, we are not going to 
9 ( increase our policy, they are trying to be firm in that 
10 | regard. They do open themselves up when they go into 
11 | litigation. It's called Dameron. You put them on notice 
12 I of an excess and the verdict comes back part of the 
13 policy. Most insureds will come in and pay over and 
14 above the policy in spite of their language because they 
15 know they are in trouble. But we are not asking them to 
16 do that in this case. That's simply not the issue. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. 
18 MR. WADDOUPS: As to Speros, and I'll give 
19 you a copy before we leave, Speros is a case where 
2 0 they're driving down the road and Fricke was driving, 
21 and Hyatt reached over and grabbed the wheel and they 
22 crashed. Interestingly enough in that case State Farm 
23 refused to defend Hyatt, the passenger, let a default 
24 judgment go against them, just like they're going to do 
25 in this case, let a default judgment go against 
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Martinez. 
MR. SCHULTZ: Your Honor, I object to this 
commentary. I mean, my goodness--
MR. WADDOUPS: Well, that's--
MR. SCHULTZ: There's no default judgment 
being entered and he knows it. 
MR. WADDOUPS: Well, you wanted to. That's 
the paperwork. 
THE COURT: I'll try to sort through it. If 
I think they're irrelevancies I'll disregard that. Go 
ahead, Mr. Waddoups. 
MR. WADDOUPS: So, anyway, Speros' own 
insurance company paid it and then they went after the 
insurance company after the responsible insurance 
company, Nationwide, hits Fricke and Hyatt. In the 
Speros court, if you read it very carefully, what the 
Court said is: Yes, you do have-- Hyatt is a permissive 
user, Hyatt's intentional conduct does not void the 
policy, which they tried to do in this particular case 
at issue. And they said the reason you can't recover 
against the driver in the case-- See, the insurance 
company for Speros, Your Honor, needed both insureds to 
pay under the policy. You know, whether it's 50/100, 
25/50, they needed both to get recouped all their 
losses. So they went to Hyatt. That's not enough. Then 
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1 | they went to Fricke, the driver, and: We want your 
2 | money, too. If you listen to State Farm's position, you 
3 | couldn't do that. Our Courts said you could do that. 
4 | The only reason they couldn't recover is because of the 
5 | motion for summary judgment, that Nationwide had filed 
6 | an affidavit saying Fricke wasn't negligent. The 
7 | plaintiffs in Speros didn't file a counter-affidavit 
saying Fricke was negligent. And that's why they didn't 
9 I get any recovery on the same policy they paid under 
10 | Hyatt, for Hyatt. So in the Speros case, and you can 
11 I read it for yourself, they got a recovery from Hyatt 
12 under the policy and they wanted another recovery for 
13 Fricke, but they didn't do a counter-affidavit to 
14 disputed facts as to the issue of negligence. So they 
15 lost on negligence as to Fricke. In our case we have a 
16 stipulation as to negligence, all three are negligent, 
17 so the Court here is not concerned with that. May I 
18 approach. 
19 THE COURT: You may. 
2 0 MR. WADDOUPS: So I will let you read that 
21 and draw your own conclusions. So, in summary, we have 
22 a situation where you have the policy that indicates, 
23 policy language that indicates to the insured, which we 
24 think is clear, that for each insured they are 
25 responsible up to $50,000, State Farm has got to pay. At 
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a minimum the statute says you have got to pay $25,000 
per insured in this case. If it's not clear and you 
have the competing clauses which I've referred to, at a 
minimum you have ambiguity on what they're going to pay 
and what they're entitled to, or responsible for, and so 
if there is any ambiguity, I guess there is if we're 
arguing it, then the insured loses anyway. So we have 
asked the Court to rule in our favor in two, one of two 
ways. Number 1, order that Pacheco, Olmos and Martinez 
have exposure up to $50,000 each out of the policy; or 
Number 2, at a minimum they have exposure up to $25,000 
under the financial responsibility section which is 
31A-22-304. We do a lot of legislation here. We take 
issue with State Farm's interpretation of that statute. 
We do a lot of legislation in our office and it has got 
to be per person. As a matter of fact, if you don't 
have insurance and you drive you are in violation of the 
criminal law. It's not per car, it's per person. 
THE COURT: Now, can you point to any language 
in the Speros case, Mr. Waddoups, that would support 
your interpretation of either the statute or the 
contract? I have got the statute in front of me, you 
cited it in your memorandum, it says--
MR. WADDOUPS: I can point to you--
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
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MR. WADDOUPS: Where they have recovered 
under Hyatt, we have to go back to the determination on 
how much, and as to whether-- See, then State Farm tried 
to say they needed to litigate the Hyatt case even 
though they let a default judgment go against them. The 
Court was troubled by that, but I could point you to the 
language where they said you could also recover under 
Speros but you didn't file a counter-affidavit saying 
they're negligent. So, therefore, you lose on the issue 
of negligence. 
THE COURT: Yeah. I see. All right. Thank you. 
MR. SCHULTZ: Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Schultz, go ahead if you have 
anything else you would like to respond to. 
MR. SCHULTZ: Yes. Let me just address a few 
of these points. I want to make one thing really clear 
if I didn't in response to your first question about 
facts. That we have stipulated for purposes of this 
motion, Your Honor, that we're not here to dispute 
whether there is liability. We have not stipulated that 
if Your Honor were to rule that there is more coverage 
available that that issue has been resolved; in other 
words, if there had to be a trial on this case, 
plaintiff, DeHerrera still has to prove these issue of 
negligence against these various parties. This was just 
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for the purposes of the motion. 
THE COURT: The declaratory judgment--
MR. SCHULTZ: Right. 
THE COURT:--is to determine how much coverage 
is provided. 
MR. SCHULTZ: Right. 
THE COURT: By the insured, not whether 
Martinez or someone else was responsible--
MR. SCHULTZ: Yes. 
THE COURT: --for the negligence. 
MR. SCHULTZ: Now, let me just say counsel 
suggested that just because we are here arguing about 
this must prove that the policy is ambiguous. That goes 
directly counter to Utah law. The First American Title 
Company case that we cited says-- or, excuse me. The 
Alf case says: "Policy terms are not necessarily 
ambiguous simply because one party seeks to endow them 
with a different interpretation according to his or her 
own interests." And, obviously, we would never have--
we would never be able to have a declaratory judgment 
ruled on as a matter of law if simply because parties 
disagreed on it that made it ambiguous. 
Now, as far as the statute is concerned, Your 
Honor, I would submit to you that the statute is clearly 
tied to vehicles and not to persons insured. If you look 
Page 2{ 
1 I at Utah Code Annotated Section 31A-22-303, it mandates 
2 motor vehicle insurance coverage. It requires an owner's 
3 policy to provide insurance for the named insured and 
4 person's using with permission, and so forth, subject 
5 to-- and this is a direct quote, "--subject to limits 
6 for each motor vehicle m amounts not less than the 
7 minimum limits specified under Section 31A-22-304." 
8 THE COURT: Where were you reading from? 
9 MR. SCHULTZ: I was reading on page 9 of my 
10 reply memo but--
11 THE COURT: Oh, I didn't find it. 
12 MR. SCHULTZ: It actually is from 31A-22-304. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. 
14 MR. SCHULTZ: Of the statute. So what it's 
15 saying is: The owner's policy has to have coverage for 
16 the named insured, persons using the vehicle with the 
17 named insured's permission, and resident relatives 
18 subject to limits for each motor vehicle m amounts not 
19 less than the minimum limits specified under 31A-22-304. 
20 And when you go to 31A-22-304, which I've quoted on page 
21 8 of my reply memo, it sets out, "Their policies 
22 containing motor vehicle liability coverage may not 
23 limit the insured's liability under that coverage below 
24 the following." And then the first one is $25,000 
25 because of liability or bodily injury to or death of one 
Page 2 
person arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in any 
one accident." And then, "Second, $50,000 because of 
liability for bodily injury to or death of two or more 
persons arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in any 
one accident." And then you can even get a $65,000 
combined coverage for property and bodily injury 
although that's not in effect here. But, clearly, when 
you combine those two statutes that the coverage is tied 
to the vehicle, you have to have that minimum amount of 
coverage on the vehicle and the language m the policy, 
as you very clearly have pointed out, does not say per 
injured person per insured. And you would have to write 
that m to follow the DeHerrera claim. Your question 
about what the language of the policy or the amount, the 
limits of liability are not increased. The response to 
that by Mr. Waddoups I think is not germane to this 
issue. What he was-- he was talking about whether or not 
more than the policy limit would have to be paid if an 
excess verdict was rendered. And his example was against 
a single insured. That's not what this provision is 
talking about. This is saying: We have the limits, we 
clearly identified on the coverage amounts that each 
person is the amount of coverage for all damages due to 
one person in the accident, and then we're saying, and 
those limits are not increased even though more than one 
Page 3 0 
person might be an insured. And we would submit, Your 
Honor, that you can rule that that's the limit as a 
matter of law. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Counsel. 
MR. WADDOUPS: I just have the-- I have a 
copy of that indicated that they were going to try to 
take a default judgment and he said no. I have a 
pleading if you want to see it. 
THE COURT: Well, I believe you. At least 
for the purpose of this argument I don't know that I 
disagree with you, and I don't think that you do either, 
Counsel. 
MR. WADDOUPS: He said he didn't try to do 
that. I have the pleadings here. 
MR. SCHULTZ: No, that's not what 1 said. 
You said that you were trying to take a default 
j udgment. 
MR. WADDOUPS: No. I said defendant, State 
Farm, was trying to take it. 
MR. SCHULTZ: That's not what--
MR. WADDOUPS: State Farm in this case hired 
other attorneys to defend this case. 
MR. SCHULTZ: Your Honor, I've got to object 
to-- None of this is in the record on this motion. 
THE COURT: I'll just say--
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MR. WADDOUPS: Well, State Farm knows their 
position that they think there is coverage up to 
$50,000. 
MR. SCHULTZ: Your Honor--
THE COURT: Well, I'll just assume for the 
sake of argument that what you represented is true, Mr. 
Waddoups, and I don't want to~-
MR. WADDOUPS: Okay. 
THE COURT: If we have to take facts, 
evidence, we have to take testimony in some case then 
there is no-- I simply couldn't rule as a matter of law, 
there would be genuine issues of material fact and I 
understand there may be some dispute m the 
preliminaries leading up to this hearing. 
MR. WADDOUPS: The only reason I mentioned 
that because when we were talking about interpretation, 
the very lawyers they hired to defend the people have a 
different opinion from this particular State Farm 
attorney. 
THE COURT: I see. 
MR. WADDOUPS: That's why I wanted to bring 
that up to you. 
THE COURT: Could be. All right. Thank you 
Counsel, I'm ready to rule. I have had an 
adequate opportunity and it seems to me that the issues 
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1 here aren't complex, they may not be simple, they may 
2 not be easy to divine but they are not complex. I've 
3 read the memoranda, I've read the provisions in both the 
4 statute and the policy, and I'm prepared to give you a 
5 ruling today. And, then, of course, Counsel, let what 
6 you do with that whatever you like. 
7 It is an interesting issue, it certainly is, 
8 but I would conclude, first of all, as I say, I 
9 certainly can't make findings, but I would conclude, 
10 first of all, that there are no genuine issues of 
11 material fact that would preclude summary judgment 
12 today. Both counsel agree. Neither of you have cited 
13 any issues of material fact that would need to be 
14 resolved by a trier of fact in a trial. So, and I would 
15 agree with both of you, there certainly are no genuine 
16 issues of material fact that would preclude summary 
17 judgment. 
18 Second, I would conclude that neither the 
19 contract in this case, meaning the insurance policy, nor 
2 0 the statute cited by the defendant are ambiguous in my 
21 judgment. The language is clear in both of those. And, 
22 of course, when the language is clear I am not to resort 
23 to any sort of extrinsic evidence to clear up or clarify 
24 what the contract might mean, I'm to use the common 
25 sense language of the contract, interpret it the way 
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ordinary people would as they read it, and I think I can 
do that here. As I say, I don't think either the 
statute or the contract are vague in any way. 
In my judgment, starting first with the--
Well, strike that. I will back up. The defendant has 
argued that it would be a violation of public policy to 
interpret the insurance policy the way the plaintiff 
would ask me to do. I disagree with that. That doesn't 
appear to be the most significant of the defendant's 
arguments. Mr. Waddoups didn't spend much time with 
that here today and I don't see any violation of public 
policy if I were to interpret the contract the way the 
plaintiff has asked me to do. 
Second, going to the contract itself, in my 
judgment, reading both the language that I have already 
read, and the other simple sentence that follows it, 
it's my judgment that it is clear that the language of 
the contract is to provide a limit of $50,000 per 
person. As I indicated or sought information in my 
question, to interpret it otherwise would require the 
addition of some language that just isn't there. The 
language says, "That the amount of property damage, the 
amount of bodily injury liability coverage as shown on 
the declaration page under each person is the amount of 
coverage for all damages due to the bodily injury to one 
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person." There's no language that says per insured. 
And, then, further, if that weren't clear at all, that 
sentence that follows it, "The limits of liability are 
not increased because more than one person may be an 
insured," makes it clear to me that it was the intent of 
those who drafted this contract, this policy of 
insurance, to limit liability to $50,000 per person per 
accident and not vary that limit with the number of 
people who may have been insured at any particular given 
time, because that's just what it says, "Liability is 
not increased because there may be more than one insured 
person." To change that to interpret it the way that the 
defendant has asked me to interpret it, again, I would 
think you would need to add language that just simply 
isn't there to rewrite the contract and say that the 
limits of liability are not increased because more than 
one person may be an insured, to strike that and say 
that the limits of liability will not be increased, 
well, would require some other interpretation than what 
the language clearly says. So in my judgment, again, I 
would conclude that the language limits the liability of 
the plaintiff in this case to $50,000 per person, not 
$50,000 per person per insured. And the same would be 
true with the statute in my judgment, the $25,000 
minimum requirement in the statute is tied to the 
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vehicle involved, not the number of people who may be in 
the vehicle who would be covered by the insurance, it 
requires at least $25,000 per injured person. There's no 
requirement in the statute of $25,000 per injured person 
per insured person. I would disagree with the 
defendant's interpretation. 
So having found that there are no genuine 
issues of material fact, and agreeing with the arguments 
of the plaintiff on all three of those points raised by 
the defendant in his memorandum, I would find that the 
plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
and, Mr. Schultz, I would ask you to prepare the order 
consistent with that and I'll take away (inaudible). 
MR. SCHULTZ: Thank you, I will do that. 
THE COURT: Now, Counsel, since you're 
preparing that, is there anything that I've left unclear 
that you need to have resolved today in order to prepare 
those documents? 
MR. SCHULTZ: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SCHULTZ: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 
[Proceedings concluded at 10:04 a.m.] 
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STRONG AND HANNI 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84180 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
Facsimile: (801)596-1508 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RAE-ANN MARTINEZ, AN INDIVIDUAL, ROBERT 
PACHECO, AN INDIVIDUAL, MANUEL OLMOS, 
AND RUBY DEHERRERA, AN, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 030920807 
Judge Robin Reese 
Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company's ("State Farm") Motion for 
Summary Judgment was heard on August 3,2005, by the Honorable Robin W. Reese, District Judge. 
Stuart H. Schultz of the law firm of Strong & Hanni appeared on behalf of State Farm. George T. 
Waddoups of the law firm of Robert J. Debry & Associates appeared on behalf of defendant Ruby 
DeHerrera. No other defendants appeared. 
004409 01034 
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The motion for summary judgment presents a legal issue which requires the Court to interpret 
an automobile insurance policy issued by State Farm to Robert Pacheco on his vehicle. This legal 
issue arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on May 1^1,2003. Defendant Manuel Olmos 
was the driver of the subject vehicle. Defendants Ruby DeHerrera and Rae-Ann Martinez were 
passengers in the subject vehicle. The Court must determine, as a matter of law, the limits of 
liability coverage available under the terms of the insurance policy for bodily injuries sustained by 
Ruby DeHerrera in the subject accident. 
Ruby DeHerrera has made third-party liability claims against Mr. Pacheco, Mr. Olmos and 
Ms. Martinez for personal injuries. For purposes of the motion for summary judgment, it is assumed 
that Robert D. Pacheco, Manual Olmos and Rae-Ann Martinez are persons negligent and insured 
under the State Farm policy who could be found liable to Ruby DeHerrera for the accident and her 
claimed injuries. It is undisputed that the liability limits for bodily injury under the State Farm policy 
are $50,000 per person and $ 100,000 per accident. It is also undisputed that State Farm has already 
paid $50,000 to Ruby DeHerrera on her third-party liability claims against Robert D. Pacheco, 
Manual Olmos and Rae-Ann Martinez. 
State Farm's position is that the liability limit under the insurance policy for Ruby 
DeHerrera's personal injury claims against Mr. Pacheco, Mr. Olmos and Ms. Martinez is the $50,000 
per injured person total. Ruby DeHerrera's position is that the per person policy limit of $50,000 
applies to each person who is insured for the accident under the policy and is negligent so that the 
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available policy limit for Ruby DeHerrera's claims against Mr. Pacheco, Mr. Olmos and Ms. 
Martinez is $50,000 each, or a total of $150,000. 
The Court, having reviewed the motion, the memoranda and other documentation filed in 
support of and in opposition to the motion, having heard oral argument, being fully advised in the 
premises, and good cause appearing, now, therefore. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that State Farm's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted, and the Court declares, as a matter of law, that the limit of liability 
insurance coverage for bodily injury under the insurance policy issued by State Farm on Robert 
Pacheco's vehicle is $50,000 for all bodily injuries sustained in one accident by one person 
regardless of whether more than one negligent person may be an insured for the accident under the 
policy. Specifically, and as a matter of law, the limit of liability coverage available for all bodily 
injury claims of Ruby DeHerrera from the automobile accident of May 11,2003, against all persons 
insured under the State Farm policy is $50,000. The Court's Order and Summary Judgment is based 
on the following reasons: 
1. There are no genuine issues of material fact which would preclude the Court from 
rendering summary judgment with respect to the legal issue involved in this motion; 
2. Section I - - LIABILITY - - Coverage A of the State Farm insurance policy, under 
the heading "Limits of Liability," states: 
The amount of bodily injury liability coverage is shown on the declarations 
page under "Limits of Liability - Coverage A - Bodily Injury. Each Person. Each 
Accident." Under "Each Person" is the amount of coverage for all damages due to 
bodily injury to one person. "Bodily injury to one person" includes all injury and 
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damages to others resulting from this bodily injury, and all emotional distress 
resulting from this bodily injury sustained by other persons who do not sustain 
bodily injury. Under "Each Accident" is the total amount of coverage, subject to the 
amount shown under "Each Person", for all damages due to bodily injury to two or 
more persons in the same accident. 
We will pay damages for which an insured is legally liable up to these 
amounts. 
The limits of liability are not increased because more than one person or 
organization may be an insured; 
3. The above-quoted policy language is neither vague nor ambiguous and therefore, the 
Court need not consider extrinsic evidence to interpret the language; 
4. The policy language unambiguously provides a limit of $50,000 in liability coverage 
per injured person for one accident regardless of whether more than one person is insured for the 
accident under the policy. To interpret the policy otherwise, as Ms. DeHerrera asks, would require 
the Court to rewrite the contract with language that is not included in the policy. Specifically, the 
policy language which states that the limits of liability are not increased because more than one 
person or organization may be an insured, clearly establishes that the maximum liability coverage 
available for Ruby DeHerrera's claims against Mr. Olmos, Mr. Pacheco and Ms. Martinez is the 
$50,000 per person per accident limit. Ms. DeHerrera's argument seeks coverage of $50,000 per 
person per insured per accident, which is contrary to the plain language of the policy; and 
5. The Court's ruling that the policy's liability limits is $50,000 for Ruby DeHerrera's 
bodily injury claims against Mr. Olmos, Mr. Pacheco and Ms. Martinez does not violate Utah public 
policy established by Utah Code Ann. §§31 A-22-303 and 31A-22-304 setting mandatory minimum 
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motor vehicle insurance coverage limits. The Court concludes, as a matter of law, that §§ 31 A-22-
303 and 31A-22-304 require the minimum coverage amounts on the insured motor vehicle with 
respect to an accident. Section 31 A-22-303. for example, requires that an owner's policy must 
provide insurance coverage for the named insured, persons using the vehicle with the named 
insured's permission, and resident relatives of the named Insured against liability arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance, or use of the motor vehicle, but all "subject to limits . . . for each motor 
vehicle in amounts not less than the minimum limits specified under Section 31A-22-304 . . ." 
Thus, Sections 31 A-22-303 and -304, taken together, connect the minimum limits to the automobile 
involved in the accident, and not to the number of insured persons involved in the accident. 
DATED this / * / day of August 2005. 
BY THE COURT 
APPROVED KS TO FORM: 
V/ 
George*^. Waddoups 
Robert J. Debry & Associates 
Attorneys for Defendant Ruby DeHerrera 
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ADDENDUM "F" 
SECTION I — LIABILITY — C O V E R A G E A 
You have this coverage if *A,% appears in the *Co\erages" 
We will 
1 pay damages which an insured becomes 
legally liaBle to pay because of 
a bodily injury to others, and 
b damage to or destruction of prop-
erty including )oss of its use, 
caused by accident resulting from the 
ownership, maintenance or use of your 
car, and 
2 defend any suit against an insured for 
such damages with attorneys hired and 
paid by us We will not defend any suit 
after we have paid the applicable limit 
of our liability for the accident which is 
the basis of the lawsuit 
In addition to the limits of liability, we will pay 
for an insured any costs listed below resulting 
from such accident 
1 Court costs of any suit for damages that 
we defend 
2 Interest on damages owed by the in-
sured due to a judgment and accruing 
a after the judgment, and until we 
pay, offer or deposit in court the 
amount due under this coverage, or 
b before the judgment, where owed 
by law, ana until we pay, offer or 
deposit in court the amount due un-
der this coverage, but only on that 
part of the judgment we pay 
3 Premiums or costs of bonds 
a to secure the release of an insured's 
property attached under a court or-
der, 
b required to appeal a decision in a 
suit for damages if we have not 
paid our h nut "of liability that ap-
plies to the suit; and 
c up to $250 for each bail bond 
needed because of an accident or 
related traffic law violation. 
We have no duty to furnish or apply for 
any bonds The amount of any bona we 
pay for shall not be more than our limit 
of liability 
4 Expenses incurred by an insured: 
a for loss of wages or salary up to 
$100 per day if we ask the insured 
to attend the trial of a civil suit 
6 
9844 4 
space on the declarations page. 
b for first aid to others at the lime of 
the accident 
c at our request 
We have the right to investigate negotiate and 
settle an> clairn'br suit 
Coverage for the Use of Other Cars 
The habjJm coverage extends to the use by an 
insured of a newly acquired car* a temporary 
substitute car or a non-owned car 
Who Is an Insured 
When we refer to your car, a newly acquired car 
or a temporary substitute car% insured means 
1 you, 
2 your spouse, 
3 the relatives of the first person named 
in the declarations, 
4 any other person while using such a car 
if its use is within the scope of consent 
of you or your spouse; and 
5 any other person or organization liable 
for the use of such a car by one of the 
above insureds 
When we refer to a non-owned car, insured 
means 
1 the first person named in the declara-
tions, 
2 his or her spouse, 
3 their relatiyes, and 
4 any person or organization which does 
not own or hire the car but is liable for 
its use by one of the above persons 
THERE IS NO COVERAGE FOR NON-
OWNED CARS 
1 IF THE DECLARATIONS STATE 
THE "USE" OF YOUR CAR IS 
OTHER THAN "PLEASURE AND 
BUSINESS", OR 
2 WHILE 
a BEING REPAIRED, SERVICED 
OR USED BY ANY PERSON 
WHILE THAT PERSON IS 
WORKING IN ANY CAR BUSI-
NESS, OR 
b USED IN ANY OTHER BUSI-
NESS OR OCCUPATION This 
does noj. apply to & private passen-
ger car driven or occupied by the 
first person named in the declara-
tions, his or her spouse or their 
-^relatives 
Trailer Coverage 
The liability coverage extends to the ownership 
maintenance or use, oy an insured, of 
1 trailers designed to be pulled by a pri-
vate passenger car or a utility vehicle 
except those trailers in 2 a. below 
Farm implements and farm wagons are 
considered trailers while pulled'on pub-
he roads by a car we insure for liability 
These trailers are not described in the 
declarations and no extra premium is 
" charged 
2 the following trailers only if they are 
described on the declarations page and 
extra premium is paid 
a trailers designed to be pulled b\ \ 
private passenger car or a utility 
vehicle 
(1) if designed to carry persons, or 
(2) while used with a motor vehi-
cle whose use is shown a* fctcommerciar on the declara-
tions page (trailers used only 
for pleasure use are covered 
even if not described and no 
extra premium paid), or 
(3) while used as premises for of-
fice, store or display purposes 
or 
b trailers not designed to be pulled b> 
a private passenger car or a utility 
vehicle 
When we refer to trailer co\erager insured 
means 
1 you. 
2 your spouse, 
1 the relatives of the first person named 
in the declarations, 
4 anv other person while using your car 
a newly acquired car or a temporary 
substitute car, if its use is within ctil 
scope of consent of you or your spouse 
and 
5 any other person or organization liable 
for the use of a coveredlraner b\ one or 
the above insureds 
THERE IS NO COVERAGE WHEN A TRAILER 
IS USED WITH A MOTOR VEHICLE THAT IS 
NOT COVERED UNDER THE LIABILITY 
COVERAGE OF THIS POLICY 
Limits of Liability 
the amount of bodily injury liability coverage is 
Shown on the declarations page under 'Limits of 
Liability - Coverage A - Bodily Injury Each 
Person. Each Accident" Under 'Each Person is 
the amount of co\erage for all damages due to 
bodily injury to one person 'Bodily injury to 
§ne person includes all injury and damages to triers resulting from this bodily injury, and all 
emotional distress resulting from this bodily in-
jury sustained b> other persons who do not sus-
tain bodily injury Under Each Accident' is the 
Total amount of coverage, subject to the amount 
shown under "Each Person", tor all damages due 
,to bodily injury to two or more persons in the 
same accident 
The amount of property damage liability co\er 
age is shown on the declarations page under 
"Limits of Liability - Coverage A -TPropem 
Damage, Each Accident" 
We will pay damages for which an insured u> 
legally Jiaole up to these amounts 
The limits ol" liability are not increased became 
more than one person or organization rna> be an 
insured 
A motor \ehiele and attached trailer are one \c 
hide Thcreiore the limits are not increased 
When Co>erage A Does Not Apply 
In addition to the limitations of coverage in Who 
Is an Insured and Trailer Coverage 
THERE IS NO COVERAGE 
I WHILE ANY VEHICLE INSURED 
L NDER THIS SECTION IS 
a RENTED OR LEASED TO OTH-
ERS 
b USED TO CARRY PERSONS FOR 
A CHARGE This docs not applv to 
the use on a ahare expense basi& of 
{\\ apri\atepassenger car or 
(2) a utility vehicle, if all passen-
gers are ndma in that area or 
The vehicle designed bv the 
manufacturer of the vehicle *i r 
carrying passengers 
BEING REPAIRED SERMCED 
OR USED BY AN r^ PERSON 
EMPLOYED OR ENGAGED IN 
ANY WAY IN A CAR BUSINESS 
i 1> If no other valid ana wolle-tiok 
insurance is aoDhcable in 
Z* 
provision applies 10 a motor 
vehicle business, its officers, 
asents and employees, but only 
to the extent the limits of li-
ability of this policy exceed the 
minimum limits of liability re-
quired by section 31A-22-304 
of the tkah Insurance Laws. 
The minimum required limits 
are: 
(a) 525,000 for each person 
and 550,000 for each ac-
cident, if the limit of li-
ability for this coverage is 
shown as a split limn on 
the declarationspage; or 
(b)' $65,000 for each accident. 
if the limit of liability for 
this coverage is shown as 
a single limit on the decla-
rations page. 
(2) This provision in its entirety 
does not appty to: 
(a) you or your spouse; 
(b) any relative•; 
(c) any resident of your 
household; or 
(d) any a°enl-, employee or part-
ner oi you, your spousey any 
relative or such resident. 
This coverage is excess for (c) 
and (d) above. 
FOR ANY BODILY INJURY TO: 
a. A FELLOW EMPLOYEE WHILE 
ON THE JOB AND ARISING 
FROM THE MAINTENANCE OR 
USE OF A VEHICLE BY AN-
OTHER EMPLOYEE IN THE 
EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS. You 
and your spouse arc covered for 
such injury to a fellow employee. 
b. ANY EMPLOYEE OF AN IN-
SURED ARISING OUT OF HIS 
OR HER EMPLOYMENT This 
does not apply to a household em-
ployee who is neither covered nor. 
required to be covered under any 
workers' compensation insurance. 
FOR; 
THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA OR ANY OF ITS 
AGENCIES; OR 
b. ANY PERSON WHO IS AN EM* 
PLOYEE OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA OR ANY 
OF ITS AGENCIES, IF THE 
PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL 
TORT CLAIMS ACT APPLY. 
4. FOR ANY DAMAGES TO PROP^ 
ERTY OWNED BY. RENTED TO. IN 
THE CHARGE OF OR TRANS-
PORTED BY AN INSURED. But cov-
erage applies to a rented: 
a. residence; or 
b. private garage 
damaged by a car we insure.-
5. FOR ANY OBLIGATION OF AN /A'-
SURED. OR HIS OR HER INSURER. 
UNDER ANY TYPE OF WORKERS-
COMPENSATION OR DISABILITY 
OR SIMILAR LAW. 
6. FOR LIABILITY ASSUMED BY THE 
INSURED UNDER ANY CONTRACT 
OR AGREEMENT 
If There Is Other Liability Coverage 
1. Policies Issued by Us to You, Your Spouse, 
or Any Relative 
If two or more vehicle liability policies is-
sued by us to you, your spouser or any rela-
tive apply to the same accident, the total 
limits of liability under all such policies 
shall not exceed that of the policy with the 
highest limit of liability. 
2. Other Liability Coverage Available From 
Other Sources 
Subject to item I, if other vehicle liability 
coverage applies, we are liable only for our 
share of the damages. Our share is the per-
cent that The limit of liability of this policy 
bears to the total of all vehicle liability cov-
erage applicable to the accident. 
3. Temporary Substitute Car, Non-Owned 
Car, Trailer 
Subject to items 1 and 2, if a temporary sub-
stitute car, a non-owned car or a trailer de-
signed for use with a. private passenger car 
or utility vehicle: 
a. has other vehicle liability coverage on! 
it; or r 
b. is sel ^ insured under any motor vehicle 
financial responsibility law, a motor 
carrier law or any similar law, 
then this coverage is excess over such insur-
ance or self-insurance. However, subject to 
8 
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items I and 2 above, this policy shall pro-
vide primary coverage if: 
a. the vehicle is owned by a car business: 
b. an insured js operating the vehicle: and' 
c. the insured is neither a person engaged 
in such car business nor that person's 
employee or agent. 
4. Newly Acquired Car 
THIS COVERAGE DOES NOT APPLY IF 
THERE IS OTHER VEHICLE LIABILITY 
COVERAGE ON A NEWLY ACQUIRED 
CAR. 
Motor Vehicle Compulsory Insurance Law 
or Financial Responsibility Law 
1. Out-of-State Coverage 
If an insured under the liability coverage is 
in another state or Canada and, as a nonresi-
dent, becomes subject to its motor vehicle 
compulsory insurance, financial responsibil-
ity or similar law: 
a. the policy will be interpreted to give the 
coverage required by the law; and 
b. the coverage so given replaces any cov-
erage in this policy to the extent re-
quired by the law for the insureds 
f' operation, maintenance or use of a car 
insured under this policy. 
Any coverage so extended shall be reduced 
to the extent other coverage applies to the 
accident. In no event shall a person collect 
more than once. 
Financial Responsibility Law 
When certified under any law as proof of 
future financial responsibility, and while re-
quired during the policy period, this policy 
snail comply"with such law to the extent re-
quired. Tne insured agrees to repay us for 
anv payment we would not have had to 
make under the terms of this policy except 
for this agreement. 
Duplicate Coverage and Arbitration 
If an insured is or would be held legally liable 
for tho damages resulting from bodily' injury 
sustained by any person to whom benefits re-
quired under no-fault coverage have been paid 
by another insurer, including the Workers' Com-
pensation Fund of Utah, we will reimburse the 
other insurer for the payment; but not in excess 
of the amount recoverable. 
The issue of liability and the amount will be de-
cided by mandatory, binding arbitration between 
the insurers. 
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COVERAGES 
This endorsement is a part Qf your policy Excep£for the changes it makes, all other terms of the 
policy remain the same and apply to this endorsgfnent It is effective at the same time as your 
policy unless a different effective date is specified by us in writing 
In consideration of the premium charged, it is agreed that your policy is changed as follows 
b The first paragraph of Limit of Li-1. DEFINED WORDS 
Non-Owned Car — The provision which 
reads 
'JNon-owned car does not include a 
rented car while it is used in connec 
tion with the insured's employment or 
business " 
is deleted 
2. SECTION IV — PHYSICAL DAMAGE 
COVERAGES 
a The following is added to the defini-
tion of Loss 
Loss does not include any reduc 
tion in the value of any vehicle or 
detachable living quarters after it 
has been repaired, as compared to 
Us value before it was damaeed 
ability — Comprehensive and Colli-
sion Coverages is changed to read 
The limit of our liability for loss to 
property or any part of it is the 
lower of 
1 the actual cash value or 
2 the cost of repair or re 
placement The cost of re 
pair or replacement does not 
include any reduction in the 
value of the property after it 
has been repaired, as com-
pared to its value before it 
was damaged 
c Item 2c of Trailer Coverage is deleted 
Chief Executive Officer 
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This endorsement is a part of your policy. Exce 
policy remain* the same and apply to this endo 
policy unless a different effective date is specifi 
the changes it makes, all other terms of tb 
ft It is effective at the same time as you 
ns in writing 
> 
In consideration of the premium charged, it is agrfgl that jwwr policy is changed as follows; 
2. 
DEFINED WORDS 
a. The following definition is added: 
Fungi - means any type or form 
of fiingus or fungi and includes: 
1. mold; 
2. mildew; and 
3. any of the following that 
are produced or released 
by fungi: 
a. mycotoxins; 
b . spores; 
c. scents; or 
d. byproducts. 
b. Non-Owned Car - The provision which 
reads: 
Non-owned car does not include a 
rented car while it is used in con-
nection with the insured's em-
ployment or business. 
is deleted. 
REPORTING A CLAIM — INSURED'S 
DUTIES 
Item 2, Notice to Us of Claim or Suit, is 
changed to read: 
Notice to Us of Claim or Suit 
If a claim or suit is made against an in-
sured, that insured musr at once send 
us every demand, notice or claim made 
and every summons or jegal process 
received. That insured also shall an-
swer questions under oath when asked 
b y anyone we name, as often as w 
reasonably ask, and sign copies of th' 
answers. 
SECTION I — LIABILITY — COVER 
AGE A 
Under the paragraph that reads "In addi 
tion to the limits of liability, we will pa; 
for an insured any costs listed below re 
suiting from such accident": 
a. item 3c is deleted. 
b, item 4 is changed to read: 
A, Trie faWowVng costs and e^ 
penses if related to and in 
curred after a civil lawsuit ha 
been filed against an insura 
for damages for which liabilir 
coverage is provided by thi 
policy: 
a. loss of-wages or salary, bu 
not other income, up tt 
$100 for each day an in-
sured attends at our re-
quest: 
(1) an arbitration; 
(2) a mediation: or 
(3) a trial of a civil suit. 
b. reasonable expenses in-
curred by an insured at 
our request, other than loss 
of wages, salary, or other 
income. 
The amount of any of the costs 
or expenses listed above that 
are incurred by an insured 
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must* be reported to us before 
we will pay. 
4. SECTION IV — PHYSICAL DAMAGE 
COVERAGES 
a. The following is added to the defini-
tion of Loss: 
Loss does not include any reduc-
tion in the value of any vehicle or 
detachable living quarters after it 
has been repaired, as compared to 
its value before it was damaged. 
b. The second paragraph of item 1 under 
COMPREHENSIVE - COVERAGE 
D is changed to read: 
Breakage of glass or loss due to 
hitting or being hit by a bird or an 
animal is payable under this cov-
erage, 
c. The following is added to COLLI-
SION - COVERAGE G: 
Loss caused by collision does not 
include loss due to: 
1. missiles or falling objects; 
2. windstorm or haih 
3. earthquake, water or flood; 
4. theft or larceny: 
5. malicious mischief or 
vandalism: or 
6. riot or civil commotion. 
d. The first paragraph of Limits of Li-
ability - Comprehensive and Colli-
sion Coverages is changed to read: 
The limit of our liability for loss to 
property or any part of it is the 
lower of: 
1. the actual cash value; or 
2. the cost of repair or re-
placement. The cost of 
repair or replacement does 
not include any reduction 
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in the value of the prop-
erty after it has been re-
paired, as compared to its 
value before it was dam-
aged. 
e. Item 2 of the provision titled Trailer 
Coverage is changed to read: 
2. Non-Owned Trailer or De-
tachable Living Quarters 
Any physical damage cover-
age in force on your car ap-
plies to a non-owned: 
a. trailer, if it is designed for 
use with a private passen-
ger car, or 
b. detachable living quarters 
unit 
used by the first perso n named 
in the declarations, his or her 
spouse or their relatives. 
The most we will pay under 
the comprehensive or collision 
coverage for a loss to such 
non-owned trailer or unit is 
$2,500. 
A non-owned trailer or detach-
able living quarters unit is one 
that: 
a. is not owned by or regis-
tered in the name of: 
(1) you, your spouse, any 
relative; 
(2) any other person resid-
ing in the same house-
h old as you, your spouse 
or any relative: or 
(3) an employer of you. 
your spouse or any 
relative; and 
b. has not been used or 
rented by or in the posses-
sion of you, your spouse 
or any relative during an> 
part of each of the last 21 
or more consecutive days. 
If you are insured by one 
or more other car policies 
issued by us, the 21 day 
limit is increased by an 
additional 21 days for each 
such additional policy. 
f. The following is added to When The 
Physical Damage Coverages Do Not 
Apply: 
(I) THERE IS NO COVERAGE FOR 
LOSS TO ANY VEHICLE DUE 
TO FUNGI. THIS APPLIES RE-
GARDLESS OF WHETHER OR 
NOT THE FUNGI RESULT 
FROM A LOSS THAT IS PAY-
ABLE UNDER ANY OF THE 
PHYSICAL DAMAGE COVER-
AGES. WE WILL ALSO NOT 
PAY FOR ANY TESTING OR 
REMEDIATION OF FUNGI, OR 
ANY ADDITIONAL COSTS 
REQUIRED TO REPAIR ANY 
VEHICLE THAT ARE DUE TO 
THE EXISTENCE OF FUNGL 
(2) THERE IS NO COVERAGE FOR 
LOSS TO ANY VEHICLE THAT 
RESULTS FROM: 
(a) NUCLEAR REACTION; 
(b) RADIAHON OR RADIOACTIVE 
CONTAMINATION FROM ANY 
SOURCE; OR 
(c) THE ACCIDENTAL OR IN-
TENTIONAL DETONATION 
OF, OR RELEASE OF RA-
DIATION FROM, ANY NU-
CLEAR OR RADIOACTIVE 
DEVICE. 
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